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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL RESERVE ACCUMULATION AND 
COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
SEPTEMBER 2011 
 
LUIS DANIEL ROSERO 
B.A., WHEATON COLLEGE 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Gerald Epstein 
 
One of the defining trends in international finance over the last two decades has been the 
unprecedented growth in the levels of international reserves accumulated by emerging 
nations. In a global financial system characterized by market failures and sudden stops, 
many developing countries have opted for the protection provided by individual 
accumulation of reserves as a second-best outcome. However, as suggested by Rodrik 
(2006), among others, the accumulation of reserves comes at a hefty opportunity cost to 
the nations that hold them. It is this particular aspect that brings into question—or at least 
merits a re-examination of—the validity and efficiency of reserve accumulation as a 
stabilization and development strategy, particularly in the context of some cash-strapped 
developing nations. This dissertation takes an in-depth look at this trend in Latin America 
viii 
 
by investigating the extent of protection of these precautionary reserves, the role of 
contagion risk in the accumulation process, and the outlook of regional arrangements of 
cooperation, such as regional reserve pooling mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of regional unification has been part of the Latin America dialogue since the 
foundation of its modern state republics. Bolivar, O‘Higgins and Miranda all shared the 
same idealistic view that the successful future of the nascent American nations; tied by 
their common history of Spanish colonialism; lied entirely in their ability to unify under a 
federalist framework. Today, as the globalization movement advances and a few clear 
poles of influence prevail in the world dynamics, this discourse remains applicable. Small 
countries throughout the developing world struggle to find their niche in the globalized 
trade and capital markets of today, which arguably still resemble and propagate many of 
the remnants of colonialism. This dissertation is largely motivated by that same belief in 
the potentially significant gains from Latin American cooperation through regional 
financial integration, and in particular regional reserve pooling.  
 It is primarily aimed at continuing the discussion that surged soon after the Asian 
Financial Crisis in favor of an overhaul of the global financial structure and the revision 
of the role of developing nations within it. As such, it builds upon the valuable work done 
by other authors in highlighting the central role that regional cooperation in Latin 
America could have in counteracting the negative effects of globalization (and in 
particular capital account liberalization) as dictated by the Washington Consensus 
(Ocampo 2000, 2006, Agosin 2000, Mistry 1999, Machinea et al 2006 & 2007, Titelman 
2006). The efforts of these economists and institutions like the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Group of Twenty-Four (G-24), and 
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the United Nations‘ Financing for Development Office (FfDO) brought to the forefront 
the importance of regional financial coordination for the successful promotion of a 
development path guided by the principles of the Monterrey Consensus. However, given 
the recent nature of the topic and the lack of an extensive treatment in the literature, much 
work remains to be done. There is particularly a gap when it comes to the extensive 
treatment of the empirical analysis of the concepts and proposals for regional financial 
integration. Thus, this dissertation sets out to fill some of those gaps. 
 Regional financial integration provides an alternative to the prevailing methods 
used by LDCs in obtaining and allocating financial resources for their development 
process. Thus, this dissertation will explore how collective financial measures at the 
regional level (among Latin American countries) might provide improved access to credit 
and increased protection from international financial volatility. Improved access, at better 
terms, to financial resources allows national governments to channel resources in a more 
efficient manner in accordance with each country‗s development goals. Unlike the 
present system in which investment decisions are largely detached from the long-term 
performance of individual countries, regional financial integration—given the appropriate 
democratic institutions—has the potential to create a participatory system of national 
investment aimed at addressing the needs and hopes of a wider sector of the local 
population. 
 More specifically, this dissertation considers the particular case of foreign reserve 
pooling. The last few decades have been marked by an unprecedented accumulation of 
reserves by developing countries throughout the world, including those in Latin America. 
The analyses presented here build from the argument that this reserve accumulation in 
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developing countries is mainly held for precautionary motives, but costly to the holding 
countries. The following chapters will explore this phenomenon of individual reserve 
accumulation by Latin American countries against the prospects for protection under a 
mechanism of regional financial cooperation. Within this context, this dissertation looks 
at the particular case of reserve pooling—arguably the easiest, most urgent first-step in 
regional coordination.  Each chapter will assess different aspects of the following over-
arching questions: What role is there for regional mechanisms of cooperation like reserve 
pools in the precautionary reserve accumulation process? How do these mechanisms 
compare to individual accumulation of reserves in terms of their effectiveness? 
 This research is particularly relevant in light of the latest global financial crisis, 
which has brought to the forefront the need for Latin American countries to protect 
against potential shocks emanating from the speculative capital flows that have recently 
flocked to the region. Moreover, the latest concerns about the reliability of US Dollar and 
Euro denominated assets cast serious doubts on the long-run wisdom of continued 
reliance on individual accumulation of reserves in the form of these assets. These 
concerns, in addition to the opportunity cost of holding such vast amounts of reserves, 
add urgency to the need to re-evaluate the precautionary accumulation of reserves via the 
individual hoarding and potential mechanisms of regional coordination. 
 
1.1 Background 
The inherent contradictions that plague the existing global financial structure were most 
clearly exposed during the 1994 Mexican currency crisis and the financial crisis of East 
Asia in 1997. These two major finance-based crises made it clear how the current system 
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can undermine the economic well-being of developing countries. In the case of East Asia, 
the inability and unwillingness of financial institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to respond immediately to the crisis, at best, contributed to a prolonged and 
deepened period of crisis. Furthermore, what began as a currency crisis from speculative 
attacks on the Thai Baht proved contagious to the economies of most countries in the 
region. Paradoxically, while most of the Southeast Asian countries were experiencing 
shortages of foreign currency and capital, both Japan and China, pressured by some 
international financial institutions (IFIs) and the US Treasury, found themselves unable to 
rescue their neighbors through the use of their extensive international reserves. Moreover, 
conditionality frameworks imposed by the IFIs as part of their aid packages and the 
inherently unstable character of the international capital markets made it very difficult –in 
some cases almost impossible – to promote auto-centric forms of development. 
 The financial crises of the last few decades made it clear that integration to global 
financial markets through financial liberalization—particularly by unregulated capital 
flows—will not only lead to an unstable growth path for developing countries, but will 
also lead to their growing dependency on capital flows from the North and the IFIs. 
Countries in the South have primarily responded to the failures in the global financial 
structure and the subsequent crises by accumulating unprecedented levels of foreign 
reserves. However, these reserves have come at a significant opportunity cost to these 
countries. In addition to individual accumulation of reserves, a growing number of 
countries in the South have turned their attention towards the creation of regional 
institutions that can serve as viable alternatives to the conventional IFIs.  
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 Faced with fierce opposition from the traditional IFIs, some of these attempts 
have failed to materialize, as in the case of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), or the 
originally proposed balance of payments support branch of the Bank of the South. 
However, other regional integration institutions like the Latin American Reserve Fund 
(FLAR) have been able to partially overcome this pressure and to continue to expand 
their efforts in favor of improved financial conditions for countries in the South. Such 
institutions are uniquely positioned to foster the type of regional financial integration that 
would allow the incorporation of developing countries into the international financial 
markets, while mitigating some of the risks associated with this process. One of the most 
fertile grounds for regional cooperation, and a good precursor of this cooperation, is 
regional integration through the co-protection provided by mechanisms of regional 
reserve pooling. 
 
1.2 Plan of the Dissertation 
Under this framework, this dissertation aims to fill some of the gaps in the literature by 
connecting two key aspects of crisis prevention and support: reserve accumulation and 
regional financial integration. Chapter 2 begins by exploring the presumed effectiveness 
of individual reserve accumulation in expanding the policy options available to 
policymakers. It has come to be widely accepted that the large stock of international 
reserves accumulated in recent years by emerging markets countries, including those in 
Latin America, minimized the negative impact that the latest global financial crisis had 
on these countries‘ economies, allowing them to promptly resume their previous growth 
path. Using a Vector Autoregressive analysis for the largest seven countries in the region, 
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this chapter tests the role that reserve accumulation has played in enhancing the policy 
tools available to the holding countries. It relies on the trilemma framework to assess the 
degree (if any) to which increases in reserves are associated with exchange rate stability, 
capital account openness, and monetary policy independence. It finds limited evidence 
for the benefits of reserves in escaping the trilemma. However, two key findings emerge 
as part of this chapter. First, in line with the traditional optimal reserve demand literature, 
it finds that increases in relative reserves are associated with higher levels of exchange 
rate stability only in instances of hard pegs. Second, the findings presented suggest that 
only countries with high levels of reserves obtain benefits in terms of their capital 
account openness and monetary policy independence as a result of increases in holdings 
of foreign reserves. 
 Given the mixed evidence for the effectiveness of individual reserve 
accumulation, the third chapter explores an alternative method of insurance based on a 
regional approach. Recent contributions to the literature have suggested that regional 
mechanisms of coordination, as complements to the international financial structure, 
would provide valuable benefits to developing countries. This chapter highlights another 
reason why mechanisms of local coordination and support are desirable additions to the 
current structure. By investigating the so far neglected role of contagion risk in the 
accumulation of reserves, the empirical findings presented here suggest that countries 
take into consideration the volatility conditions of their neighbors when determining their 
optimal level of reserves. Moreover, given that countries in Latin America appear to 
purchase insurance against contagion risk, this chapter argues that a mechanism of 
reserve pooling that increases the protection of all members of the pool would thus 
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reduce the risk of contagion and thereby the opportunity cost faced by individual 
countries aiming to protect against it. 
 In light of the findings in the two previous chapters, Chapter 4 attempts to probe 
the effectiveness of reserve accumulation in the form of regional reserve pools by 
documenting the experience of the only institution of this kind in Latin America. 
Established in 1978 as the Andean Reserve Fund, the Latin American Reserve Fund 
(FLAR) continues to be a central component of the regional financial architecture in 
Latin America. As the only institution of its kind in the region, FLAR provides valuable 
insights into the feasibility of mechanisms of regional cooperation aimed at improving 
the efficiency of crisis prevention and management. This is especially important in the 
midst of the unprecedented unilateral accumulation of international reserves by countries 
in the region during past couple of decades. Moreover, it presents a framework for how 
these regional institutions can retain their own viability by dealing with endemic issues of 
both moral hazard and sovereignty concerns of member countries. Adopting a 
quantitative and qualitative approach, this chapter empirically assesses the effectiveness 
of FLAR‘s interventions, and provides an institutional analysis of its current and future 
viability. It contributes to the literature by developing an in-depth analysis of the 
outcomes of interventions of FLAR. 
 Overall, this dissertation contributes to the literature by revisiting the individual 
accumulation of reserves as a strategy for crisis prevention, and consequently 
development promotion. It proposes regional reserve pooling—as part of a process of 
regional cooperation—as an alternative, supplementary approach to the prevailing 
methods of crisis prevention and support. It argues that regional financial coordination in 
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Latin America, guided by the already successful experience of FLAR, has the potential to 
provide a cost-efficient alternative to precautionary reserve accumulation that would 
allow the countries in the region to better survive and thrive in a global system of open-
economies, which is still characterized by undemocratic institutions and highly volatile 
financial markets. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HAS RESERVE ACCUMULATION WORKED? A VECTOR 
AUTOREGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The repercussions of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-10 were felt throughout the 
world, including in Latin America. However this last set of countries, along with other 
emerging economies, appears to have been uniquely positioned to weather the recession 
more effectively and experienced a milder and shortened version of it. After experiencing 
a short-lived real GDP contraction of -1.5% (only -0.1% if we consider only South 
America) in 2009, the region‘s GDP swiftly recovered to pre-crisis growth rates in 2010. 
This impressive performance from one of the traditionally most unstable regions in the 
world stands in sharp contrast to the much direr experiences of developed economies, 
particularly those of the United States and Europe, which experienced average GDP 
contractions of -2.4% and -4.1%, respectively during this same year
1
. 
 One prevailing explanation for this reversal of fortunes is the recent 
unprecedented accumulation of international reserves by most emerging market 
economies, including those in Latin America. This stands in direct contrast to the modest 
stocks of reserves held by developed nations. By 2009, Latin American countries held 
foreign reserves of nearly US$594 billion, or 256% higher than those held a decade 
earlier. Arguments in favor of precautionary accumulation of reserves hold that access to 
liquid reserves allows countries to deter and deal with shocks to their currencies, thus 
avoiding the painful readjustment processes associated with currency and banking crises. 
                                                 
1
 Data obtained from UNCTAD-Stat. 
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Based on this observation, some in the literature (e.g. Aizenman 2009) have concluded 
that enhanced reserve stocks have in fact fulfilled their mission, and more importantly 
that fears of excessive accumulations proved to be overblown. 
 While foreign reserves serve an undoubtedly important role as buffers in the event 
of a shock, and perhaps more importantly as deterring signals to potential speculators, 
they carry a significant opportunity cost (see Rodrik 2005, among others). Therefore, 
policy aimed at shielding the domestic economy should not simply follow Mrs. 
Machlup‘s hoarding approach to her wardrobe (Machlup 1966). Reserve accumulation 
should instead be informed by evidence of its effectiveness at improving the expected 
outcomes. Given the unprecedented accumulation of costly reserves by developing 
countries and the ambiguous evidence for their effectiveness, it is critical to evaluate 
whether reserves do in fact ‗work‘. 
 In this context, and within an empirical framework, this chapter directly tests the 
effectiveness of foreign reserves in enhancing the policy options at the disposal of 
policymakers. More specifically this chapter uses data for the largest seven Latin 
American countries in the last three decades to directly assess the degree to which 
reserves contribute to any of the three traditional goals associated with the impossible 
trilemma of international finance: Exchange rate stability, free flows of capital, and 
effective control over monetary policy. Using Vector Autoregression Analysis (VARs), 
this chapter finds mixed evidence for the presumed benefits of reserve accumulation. 
This analysis shows that, with a few exceptions, the effect of changes in the relative 
levels of reserves on any of the three trilemma goals is not statistically significant from 
zero, undermining some of the traditional expectations. However, the few exceptions 
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identified hint at two key conclusions: First, in line with the traditional optimal reserve 
demand literature, we find that increases in relative reserves are associated with higher 
levels of exchange rate stability only in instances of hard pegs. Second, our findings 
suggest that only countries with high levels of reserves obtain benefits in terms of their 
capital account openness and monetary policy independence as a result of increases in 
holdings of foreign reserves. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Reserves Accumulation Motives 
In line with the majority of emerging market countries around the world, Latin American 
countries have accumulated unprecedented levels of international reserves. This growth 
in reserves was most pronounced in the period following the turmoil associated with the 
East Asian Financial Crisis, and has turned negative only once during a brief reprieve 
associated with the latest global financial crisis. Research into the motivations for this 
impressive accumulation of reserves is vast, and can be subdivided into two main views. 
First, the precautionary approach is based on a perceived necessity to self-insure against 
external shocks associated with greater exposure to international financial and trade 
markets (e.g. Heller 1966, Feldstein 1999, Aizenman et al. 2007). The second approach, 
known as the mercantilist approach, views reserve accumulation as a byproduct of the 
activities of monetary authorities engaged in currency manipulation to boost the 
comparative advantage of their countries‘ exports (Dooley et al. 2005). Despite the 
differences in motivations, both the precautionary and mercantilist roles of reserves 
presuppose high liquidity for the assets held, and an implicit inter-temporal investment 
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tradeoff. Therefore, this extensive accumulation of international reserves comes at a hefty 
social opportunity cost (Rodrik 2006). 
 
2.2.2 Views on the Precautionary Efficacy of Reserves 
Given the context of high, growing and costly international reserves, it is sensible to 
assess the degree to which reserves are actually serving their intended precautionary 
purpose. Evidence from previous studies suggests a mixed conclusion. Among the works 
that are in line with the precautionary expectations of reserves, Obstfeld et al. (2009) find 
that while the level of reserves relative to GDP is not significantly associated (in 
statistical terms) with depreciations of the exchange rate, the level of ―underinsurance‖—
defined as the ratio of actual reserves to those predicted by their model
2—is significantly 
and negatively associated with such depreciations. This suggests that countries that 
accumulated sufficient reserves were more likely to have better weathered the recent 
crisis, while those that did not accumulate enough paid the consequences in the form of 
large currency depreciations. Similarly, in a review of the applicability of traditional 
leading (i.e. warning) indicators in explaining the latest global financial crisis, Frankel 
and Saravelos (2010) conclude that international reserves (through different 
specifications) is one of two consistently significant indicators of crisis vulnerability
3
. 
Moreover, their findings can be interpreted as suggestive of reserves serving a stabilizing 
role. For instance, they find that the level of reserves relative to GDP is positively and 
significantly associated with exchange rate appreciation and changes in industrial 
                                                 
2
 Their model estimates expected reserve-to-GDP ratios by accounting for financial openness, the 
prevailing exchange rate regime, and monetary depth, as captured by M2.  
3
 Specifications of reserves include Reserves/GDP; Reserves as a percentage of external debt; Reserves in 
months of imports; M2/Reserves; and Short-term debt as a percentage of reserves. 
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production, and negatively and significantly associated with the likelihood of a country 
recurring to the IMF for help. Moghadam (2010), using cross sectional data for 57 
emerging market countries for the 2008-2009 crisis, finds that higher pre-crisis levels of 
reserves (relative to external financing requirements)  were positively and significantly 
associated with higher percentage changes in real output. Moreover, they conclude that 
while there are gains to reserve accumulation in terms of output growth, countries face 
diminishing returns to scale in accruing these gains. That is, countries with little relative 
reserves benefit more from the protection of reserves than do countries with reserve 
stocks exceeding 100% of short-term debt.
4
 
 In contrast, other studies point to less encouraging results with regards to the 
effectiveness of international reserve holdings in fulfilling their presumed precautionary 
role. Chief among this part of the literature is a strand that emphasizes the apparent shift 
by emerging market economies from the ―fear of floating‖5 to the ―fear of reserve loss‖ in 
recent years. Aizenman and Hutchison (2010) note that despite their unprecedented 
accumulation of foreign reserves, emerging market countries (including those in Latin 
America, with the exception of Venezuela) relied more heavily on exchange rate 
depreciation, rather than reserve draw downs to counter pressures associated with the 
latest global financial crisis. Table 2.1 reproduces this evidence for the seven emerging 
economies in Latin America. Aizenman (2009) suggests that Latin American countries 
might have been particularly prone to suffer from the ―fear of reserve loss‖ due to their 
                                                 
4
 These results are however at odds with the data that shows that many emerging markets did not rely on 
meaningful draw downs of their reserves during the last crisis, but rather responded by allowing their 
currencies to depreciate. Moreover, while the coefficient is lower for the high-reserve subsample, the 
significance of the other coefficient changes, which hints at the possibility of biased estimates. The size of 
the resulting coefficient of reserves is unrealistically high, and thus lacks economic significance. 
5
 As presented in Calvo and Reinhart (2002).  
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relatively higher exposure to changes in the commodity markets and their lower levels of 
public and private savings.  
Table 2.1. Exchange Market Pressure Absorption 
Country 
Exchange Rate 
Depreciation 
Reserve Loss 
Exchange Market 
Pressure 
Argentina 17.55% 0.86% 18.41% 
Brazil 51.59% 8.25% 59.84% 
Chile 18.49% -4.80% 13.69% 
Colombia 42.56% 1.55% 44.11% 
Mexico 48.41% 5.93% 54.34% 
Peru 15.66% 16.29% 31.95% 
Venezuela 0.00% 22.89% 22.89% 
Source: Adapted from Aizenman and Hutchison (2010) 
  
 Similarly, Artus (2009) finds that emerging market economies opted for 
conserving their accumulated reserves at the expense of high depreciation of their 
currency. Moreover, since in some of these countries reserves stocks were built as a result 
of speculative capital inflows, these accumulated reserves are not seen as effective 
safeguards against capital flight during a reversal of fortunes. Blanchard et al. (2009) 
reach a similar conclusion, and suggest that the automatic response by emerging markets 
to further accumulate reserves might harm the prospects for economic recovery, and are 
likely to accentuate the problems associated with global imbalances. 
 Other arguments in the literature that question the precautionary benefits of 
reserve accumulation are based on the distortions caused by these stocks on the monetary 
base on the holding countries, as well as the implications for the rest of the world in the 
form of global imbalances. Kletzer (2000) concludes that the accumulation of 
international reserves may prove counterproductive. The expansion of the monetary base 
that is usually associated with rising reserves can lead to a change in the fundamentals 
and consequently lead to the currency depreciations that they are supposed to protect 
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against in the first place. Glick and Hutchison (2009) find that countries with high levels 
of reserves (e.g. China) face growing challenges in reining in inflationary pressures 
resulting from monetary base expansions associated with rising international reserve 
holdings. Attempts to sterilize these expansions in the monetary base not only grow 
costlier, but also more futile as reserve accumulation grows to some of the unprecedented 
levels seen in some emerging countries in recent years
6
. In this sense, the accumulation of 
reserves, rather than providing the expected countercyclical protection may actually lead 
to distortions in the exchange rate, and more importantly can undermine the country‘s 
monetary policy independence. 
 
2.2.3 Reassessing the Benefits of Reserve Accumulation 
The unprecedented accumulation of costly international reserves by emerging market 
countries, along with the apparent ambiguity in terms of the ability of these reserves to 
serve their intended purposes makes it critical to reassess to what extent reserve 
accumulation has actually ‗worked‘. The remainder of this chapter will consider this 
question in the context of the past three decades in the seven largest economies in Latin 
America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Most of 
these countries have experienced directly the havoc associated with global financial 
instability and have (with the exception of Venezuela) embraced a strategy of managed 
flexible exchange rates supported by large stocks of reserves. Moreover, the period 
considered captures the major periods of instability in the region (e.g. the Lost Decade, 
                                                 
6
 With a fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate regime, the rise of reserves leads to exchange rate appreciation, 
which can be combated with sterilization of these inflows. The net result is the growth of the money 
supply, as well as growing upward pressure on the price level. As inflation and M2 increase, it becomes 
more difficult to justify the tradeoff between inflation and a stable exchange rate.  
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contagion effects from the East Financial crisis, the Argentinean Crisis, as well as the 
effects of the most recent global financial crisis), and consequently provides a 
comprehensive view into the effects of varying levels of reserves on these countries 
policy instruments and economic outcomes. 
 In order to assess the benefits that reserve stocks provide in terms of expanding 
policy options, this chapter relies on the traditional Trilemma framework derived from 
the Mundell-Flemming Model (Mundell 1963, Fleming 1962) as a baseline approach. 
Under the Trilemma framework, countries in an open-economy are constrained in their 
ability to simultaneously accomplish the three traditional goals of macroeconomic policy-
makers: exchange rate stability, monetary policy autonomy, and the free movement of 
capital flows. Open economies are faced with a choice of two of these goals, at the 
expense of the third. During the classical Gold Standard era countries opted for exchange 
rate stability—in the form of fixed exchange rates—and free movements of capital, while 
sacrificing monetary autonomy, and thus their ability to implement counter-cyclical 
monetary policy (Triffin 1963). As argued in Obstfeld et al. (2005), that strategy stands in 
contrast with the international infrastructure that prevailed during the Bretton Woods era 
when the choice of policy mix was characterized by a return of monetary policy 
autonomy and stable exchange rates—albeit at the expense of capital account 
liberalization. 
 Latin America‘s recent history in negotiating the policy mix shows that in the 
1980s most of the region opted for overvalued exchange rates (mostly in the form of 
unofficial pegs) and control over its monetary policy. Capital controls—not always 
binding—were put in place to rein in some of the rising pressures of capital flight. 
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However, adverse conditions in the international financial markets, along with 
excessively expansionary monetary policy made capital flight and the eventual 
devaluation of the currency unavoidable. The liberalization process of the 1990s in the 
region brought with it a re-evaluation of the trilemma policy mix; leading to a new era of 
capital account liberalization, (mostly) flexible exchange rates, and consequently the 
rendering of countercyclical monetary policy ineffective. This choice proved particularly 
costly as integration into the international financial structure entailed further risk 
exposure to the vagaries of international markets. 
 In this context, this chapter considers whether international reserves allow 
countries to ‗ease the trilemma‘ by fostering any of its three policy goals. Literature 
dealing with the direct effects of international reserves accumulation on the three 
components of the trilemma is limited. Aizenman (2009) claims that the large 
accumulation of international reserves by emerging market countries has made it possible 
for them to adopt a ―middle-ground‖ configuration of the trilemma, under which they can 
afford to have managed exchange rate flexibility, and increasing integration into the 
world financial markets, while retaining a degree of monetary policy independence. This 
new prevalent arrangement is argued to have resulted in better outcomes in terms of 
adjusting to the shocks associated with the last global financial crisis. Similarly 
Aizenman et al. (2010) concludes that only in countries with reserves that exceed 21% of 
their GDP, do these reserves allow them to escape the trilemma. On the other hand, Glick 
and Hutchison (2009) through an analysis of the Chinese case, argue that reserve 
accumulation can compromise monetary control. This is of particular concern for 
instances in which sterilization becomes less feasible. Given some of the existing voids 
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and contradicting evidence, this chapter contributes to the literature by explicitly looking 
at the relationship of reserve accumulation and the policy goals under the trilemma. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Measuring the Trilemma 
This analysis makes use of the indices developed in Aizenman et al. (2008) for the three 
policy choices that countries face under the traditional trilemma approach. Whether in the 
form of an explicit fixed exchange rate regime (e.g. Argentina‘s currency board period), 
or through a managed float, stability of the exchange rate is highly valued by open 
economies
7. The index used to capture a country‘s exchange rate stability is calculated as 
follows, 
     
    
                           
 
Where the exchange rate is expressed as the price of a unit of US currency in terms of the 
domestic currency, and the standard deviation measure is based on a yearly calculation of 
monthly data.
8
 An ERS index of one is characteristic of a country with a perfectly fixed 
exchange rate, while a value of zero corresponds to a country with a pure float of its 
currency. 
 While more nuanced, the argument in favor of capital account openness as a 
policy goal derives from the assumption that free flow of capital allows for interest rate 
parity, and thus access to more and cheaper access to financial capital to finance domestic 
                                                 
7
 While a small number of emerging market countries do opt for complete exchange rate flexibility, free 
floats by their own nature imply instability through exchange rate risk. This is particularly of concern in the 
context of relative small emerging economies like those of Latin America (see Devlin et al. 2001) 
8
 Further descriptions of this and the remaining indices are available from Aizenman et al. (2010) 
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projects in capital-deprived regions.
9
 In order to capture the second policy goal of the 
trilemma,—capital account openness—this chapter relies on the Chinn-Ito index (KAO). 
This index accounts for de jure capital account liberalization, based on reported 
restrictions on current and capital account transactions, the presence of multiple exchange 
rates, and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. Possible values of this 
index range from zero to one, with higher values representing instances of countries with 
a more open capital account.  
 The third policy goal under the trilemma is that of monetary policy independence. 
The monetary policy independence index (MPI) is captured by comparing the behavior of 
domestic short-term interest rates to those of a base country, such that, 
    
             
 
 
Where ii accounts for the monthly money market interest rate in the Latin American 
country under consideration, and ij corresponds to the US monthly money market rate. As 
the previous two indices, the MPI index ranges from zero to one, with higher values 
associated with countries with more control over their monetary policy—as expressed by 
the divergence of and variation of their interest rate relative to that of the base country. 
 Historical representations of the three indices under consideration confirm the 
trade-offs faced under the trilemma approach. Moreover, Figure 2.1 below shows the 
changes in the policy choices adopted in the region. In recent years, most of the largest 
Latin American countries appear poised to favoring monetary policy autonomy and 
                                                 
9
 Edison et al. (2004) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature in this regard. However, it is 
important to note that while a component of the traditional trilemma framework, complete capital account 
openness should not necessarily be a desirable goal under all conditions. For instance, Lee and Jayadev 
(2005) address the potential negative effects of it in terms of economic growth, and income distribution.  
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capital account liberalization, at the expense of exchange rate stability. Argentina and 
Venezuela, by contrast, have opted for maintaining relatively more control over their 
currency by restraining capital flows into their economies. After 2002, Argentina‘s and 
Venezuela‘s ERS index values increased in a mostly consistent fashion. Concurrently 
their MPI index values were proportionally decreasing. For other Latin American 
countries like Chile, Colombia, and Peru, the KAO index increased to one in recent years, 
as they disbanded any remaining capital controls and embraced full capital account 
liberalization. Exchange rate stability, however, was sacrificed during this time, and has 
settled around a value of 0.2 in these countries. 
Figure 2.1. Developments in the Policy Trilemma 
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trilemma constraints. On the whole, there appears to be preliminary evidence for an 
attempt in the region to adopt moderated policy choices, while shying away from policy 
extremes in either direction. For instance, most countries in the region rely on managed 
flexible exchange rates, some—albeit more lenient—capital controls, and monetary 
independence within a context of inflation targeting. 
 
2.3.2 The Role of Reserve Accumulation: Easing the Trilemma? 
In order to assess the effectiveness of international reserve accumulation, this chapter 
seeks to explore the relationship between each of the indices described above and the 
relative level of reserves. Before delving into a more formal analysis, this section 
formalizes the hypothetical expectations and explores underlying trends in the data. 
 A preliminary look at the relationship between international reserves and the 
Exchange Rate Stability index suggests that reserves as a share of GDP (RESGDP) have 
been positively associated with higher levels of this index (Figure 2.2) in Latin America. 
High levels of international reserves allow countries facing devaluation pressures to 
sustain a given target exchange rate by drawing down these reserves, or more importantly 
by signaling the ability of the central monetary authority to respond to these pressures. 
For instance, Obstfeld et al. (2009) find that in the context of the 2008 financial crisis, a 
country‘s relative level of international reserves was a good predictor of exchange rate 
movements. Countries with insufficient levels of reserves were more likely to experience 
currency depreciation following the crisis. An alternative view of international reserves 
accumulation suggests that high levels of reserves are a byproduct of stable—purposely 
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undervalued—exchange rates. Countries are seen to rely on these undervalued exchange 
rates aimed at gaining mercantilist advantage for their exports (Dooley et al., 2005).  
Figure 2.2. Exchange Rate Stability and Reserves (1980-2008) 
 
 Traditional arguments in favor of capital account openness suggest that in the 
context of emerging nations like those of Latin America, the elimination of barriers to 
capital should lead to capital flowing into these countries in search of better returns. 
Positive net inflows of capital would thus be associated with capital account surpluses, 
which could finance deficits in the current account or add to existing surpluses in the 
latter. Consequently, based on the simple accounting of the balance of payments 
accounts, capital account liberalization should result in additions to a country‘s stock of 
international reserves, with other things being held constant. Capital account surpluses 
are assumed to arise primarily from a combination of pull factors (e.g. inherently higher 
rates of return on capital) and structural conditions (e.g. lack of capital controls and 
predictable monetary policy). Conversely, higher levels of international reserves can 
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related to the exposure of more mobile capital flows. In either case, the relationship 
between reserves and the extent of capital account liberalization would be expected to be 
positive. A scatter plot of the KAO index and the level of reserves adjusted by the level 
of gross domestic product (Figure 2.3) provides prima facie evidence in support of this 
positive relationship. Thus, higher relative levels of reserves seem to be associated with 
instances of more liberalized capital accounts. 
Figure 2.3. Capital Account Openness and Reserves (1980-2008) 
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devastating to an already ailing economy. A process of sterilization (through the purchase 
of domestic financial assets by the central bank), along with the original intervention 
through the use of foreign reserves, makes  it possible to respond to deflationary 
pressures on the exchange rate, while retaining monetary autonomy by leaving the 
interest rate target unaffected. 
 Conversely, when faced with an undesirably appreciated domestic currency, an 
active central bank has the option of counteracting the resulting upward pressure on the 
money supply through the sale of domestic financial assets to match increasing foreign 
reserves acquired in the currency stabilization process. An alternative view of the 
relationship between international reserves and monetary policy independence 
emphasizes causality running from the latter to the former. That is, countries that enjoy 
monetary policy independence can engage in countercyclical monetary policy to address 
shocks to the internal economy, and thus ensure more stability in the current and financial 
accounts.  Figure 2.4 below shows the relationship between the relative level of reserves 
and the monetary independence index (MPI). Contrary to expectations, this plot suggests 
that a negative—albeit small—relationship between these two variables may prevail.  
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Figure 2.4. Monetary Policy Independence and Reserves (1980-2008) 
 
2.3.3 Modeling the Relationship 
In sum, higher levels of reserves, through the channels outlined above, are assumed to 
contribute to the easing of the trilemma by promoting higher levels of each of its 
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employed in the analysis are presented in Appendix A. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
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Stationarity results are presented in Appendix B. 
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0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
RESGDP
M
P
I
26 
 
contemporaneous determination suggested by the hypothesized relationship among the 
variables present us with a clear potential for simultaneity, and consequently biased 
estimators. To avoid this issue, and to benefit from the richness in the analysis from 
recursive effects, the empirical analysis used here is based on a Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) model of the form: 
                               
Where yt accounts for the vector of the respective endogenous variables considered, A1, 
… , Ap represent the matrices of coefficients to be calculated,    is the intercept to be 
estimated, and Ɛt corresponds to a vector of innovations that are uncorrelated with their 
own lagged values and those of the right-hand side variables. 
 Moreover, in order to determine the appropriate number of lags to be included in 
the analysis, a sequential modified likelihood ratio (LR) test is conducted, such that: 
                              
      
 
Results for these tests are also reported in Appendix B. 
 Indices are estimated for the quarterly data using the methodology outlined above 
and in Aizenman et al. (2008). All data, with the exception of the MPI values, was 
obtained from the IMF‘s International Financial Statistics database.10 For ERS, the 
United States is considered the center country, and thus the exchange rate values used are 
based on the domestic currency value of a US Dollar. Similarly, in the case of KAO, the 
US money market interest rate is used as a point of comparison relative to the domestic 
money market interest rate. In line with previous works in the literature, data for 
                                                 
10
 Data for MPI is available yearly from http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/trilemma_indexes.htm. Quarterly values 
were imputed from these dataset by assigning the annual value to the quarters of the respective year. This 
appears to be a valid assumption, given the relative stability of this index. 
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countries with limited money market interest rate data is supplemented with values for 
the lending rate. RESGDP is calculated as the ratio of total international reserves minus 
gold and the seasonally-adjusted quarterly gross domestic product for each country. 
 A useful alternative to interpret the VAR estimates is through the use of impulse 
response functions. The following section of this chapter presents accumulated impulse-
response function tables based on shocks of one unit of the residuals. Based on these 
findings, it is possible to narrow down our analysis to account for the effects of shocks to 
the indices of interest as a result of changes in the relative level of reserves.  
 
2.4 Results 
The preliminary evidence presented in the previous section suggests a role for 
international reserve accumulation in advancing the main goals of the traditional Triffin 
trilemma. This section presents the results from the more exhaustive, disaggregated VAR 
analysis outlined above. Data availability differed across countries, and is reflected in the 
respective figures. 
 
2.4.1 Exchange Rate Stability and Reserves 
Figure 2.5 presents the accumulated impulse responses of the Exchange Rate Stability 
index to a one-unit shock to ΔRESGDP for each of the individual countries. Contrary to 
expectations, our VAR analysis provides limited empirical support for the presumed 
positive relationship between international reserves and the stability of a country‘s 
exchange rate. Based on these findings, it appears that countries that see reserve 
accumulation as a way out of the trilemma by trying to sustain stable exchange rates—
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while simultaneously being committed to liberalized capital accounts and independent 
monetary policy—are bound to see their attempts fail. This finding is in line with the 
recent literature on ―the fear of reserve loss‖, under which most emerging countries 
(including those in Latin America) despite having unprecedented levels of reserves 
during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, experienced significant depreciations of 
their currencies (Aizenman and Hutchison 2010). 
 Despite the limited evidence for the benefits of reserve accumulation with regards 
to exchange rate stability, it is important to note another important finding from the above 
results. Of the seven Latin American countries considered in the analysis, only 
Argentina‘s (and to a lesser degree Venezuela‘s11) exchange rate stability appears to 
benefit from increases in relative reserves. This is of particular interest given the 
prominent role that fixed exchange rate regimes have played in these two countries 
during parts of the period used in our analysis. The impulse response of ERS to a shock 
in ΔRESGDP is especially large and statistically significant in Argentina. A closer look 
at the Argentinean case is merited.  
 
  
                                                 
11
 Venezuela is the only country in the sample which maintained a pegged exchange rate during the last 
financial crisis. It was also the only country that relied entirely on foreign reserve reductions to absorb the 
exchange market pressure associated with this crisis (see Table 1). 
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Figure 2.5. Accumulated Impulse Responses of Exchange Rate Stability  
to Shocks in International Reserves 
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Note: The solid line represents the accumulated impulse response to a one-unit shock in ΔRESGDP. The 
dashed lines show ±2 S.E. confidence intervals. 
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2.4.2 Argentina’s Currency Board 
 In an attempt to rein in the hyperinflation that prevailed at the end of the 1980s, 
Argentina opted for the establishment of a currency board on April 1, 1991. Under this 
arrangement the Argentinean Peso was tied to the US dollar at a 1-to-1 rate until its 
collapse in January 6, 2002. As discussed in Spiegel (2002), traditional currency boards 
must meet three criteria: maintain a fixed exchange rate with the anchor currency, 
provide for full convertibility between the domestic and the anchor currency, and fully 
back its monetary liabilities with foreign reserves. While Argentina‘s currency board did 
not always meet these criteria in their entirety (see Hanke and Schuler (2002)), it 
undoubtedly represented the only long-term binding hard peg in the region in recent 
history. The traditional theory on reserve accumulation holds that countries with fixed 
exchange rate regimes require higher levels of reserves relative to flexible exchange rate 
arrangements (Haberler (1977)). Thus, it follows that of all the Latin American countries 
considered, Argentina presents the only consistently significant evidence in favor of the 
role of reserves in supporting exchange rate stability.  
 This effect is further illustrated by the fact that this relationship becomes 
statistically insignificant when we conduct a VAR analysis of the subsample of the period 
following the disbanding of the currency board
12
.  Figure 2.5a shows the accumulated 
response of ERS to a one-unit shock to ΔRESGDP for the post-currency board period 
(2002Q-2009Q3). As can be seen from this graph, once Argentina allowed its exchange 
rate to float, the relationship between changes in reserves and the stability of the 
                                                 
12
 At the α=0.1 level of significance. 
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exchange rate is no longer statistically significant, and therefore appears to reflect the 
experience of the other countries in the region. 
Figure 2.5a. Argentina Post-Currency Board: Accumulated Impulse Responses of 
Exchange Rate Stability to Shocks in International Reserves 
 
 
 
 Taken together, this evidence suggests the foreign reserves play a role in 
promoting exchange rate stability only in instances of fixed exchange rate regimes—such 
as that of Argentina‘s currency board in the 1990s and early 2000s. For other countries 
with managed flexible exchange rates, or even softer pegs (e.g. Brazil 1994-1998) there is 
no evidence of higher exchange rate stability associated with larger changes in the level 
of relative reserves. 
 
2.4.3 Capital Account Openness, Monetary Independence and Reserves 
Similar to the findings for the relationship of reserves and ERS, the impulse-response 
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Figure 2.6. Accumulated Impulse Responses of Capital Account Openness  
to Shocks in International Reserves 
 
        
        
         
 
 
 
 
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Argentina (1993Q2-2009Q3)
-.006
-.005
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Brazil (1991Q3-2009Q3)
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Chile (2000Q2-2009Q3)
-.020
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Colombia (1994Q2-2009Q3)
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
.010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Mexico (1982Q2-2009Q3)
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
.030
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Peru (1996Q4-2009Q3)
-.0010
-.0005
.0000
.0005
.0010
.0015
.0020
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Venezuela (1997Q3-2009Q3)
Note: The solid line represents the accumulated impulse response to a one-unit shock in ΔRESGDP. The 
dashed lines show ±2 S.E. confidence intervals. 
 
33 
 
Figure 2.7. Accumulated Impulse Responses of Monetary Policy Independence  
to Shocks in International Reserves 
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to a one-unit shock to ΔRESGDP. Here again, all countries, with the exception of Peru 
(and to a lesser degree Brazil in the case of ΔKAO), show no evidence of experiencing 
gains in either capital account openness and/or monetary policy independence due to 
rising changes in the relative level of reserves. 
 
2.4.4 Peru: An Exception to the Rule? 
In addition to showing little evidence for the expected gains in capital account openness 
and monetary policy independence associated with reserve accumulation, Figure 2.6 and 
2.7 highlight the stark difference between the responses by ΔKAO and MPI in Peru and 
those in the other countries considered. Based on these results it appears that reserve 
accumulation ‗works‘ for Peru in terms of encouraging higher levels of capital account 
openness and monetary policy independence, and thus easing the trilemma. This raises an 
interesting question: why does reserve accumulation benefit Peru, but not other 
countries? 
 Further analysis shows that Peru is an exception to the rule only in the sense that 
it is uniquely positioned (in the region) to benefit from reserve accumulation. That is, 
unlike its neighbors Peru has maintained exceptionally high levels of international 
reserves relative to their GDP.  Figure 2.8 shows Peru‘s reserve position relative to the 
rest of the region. For the period under consideration, Peru has maintained consistently 
higher levels of relative reserves. Indeed in recent years that level has exceeded 20% of 
its GDP, and by 2009, the country‘s relative reserves were almost twice as large as the 
regional average. This observation is significant when put in the context of previous 
findings by others in the literature, who have argued that only at high levels of relative 
reserves are countries able to escape the trilemma. For instance Aizenman et al. (2010) 
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finds that high levels of relative reserves (exceeding a 21% of GDP threshold) allow 
countries ―…to pursue a higher weighted average of MI and KAOPEN, i.e. relax the 
trilemma.‖ Once this observation is taken into account, it appears that the evidence found 
in this chapter supports their assertion that reserve accumulation ‗works‘ only for those 
countries with already high pre-existing levels of relative reserves. As of today, of all the 
large emerging Latin American countries, only Peru meets this threshold. 
Figure 2.8. Peru's Foreign Reserve Accumulation in Perspective (1996-2008) 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Latin American countries, like the majority of emerging markets across the globe, have 
embarked in an unprecedented process of international reserve accumulation. These 
reserves, however, do not come free. Therefore, it is critical to assess the degree to which 
reserves are actually serving their desired purpose, and to what degree could these 
purposes be achieved in a more cost-efficient manner. This chapter builds on the limited 
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(and somewhat ambiguous) existing evidence by directly delving into the question of the 
effectiveness of international reserves in enhancing any of the policy goals considered 
under the traditional trilemma of international finance. 
 Contrary to most traditional expectations, the VAR analysis carried out in this 
chapter finds little evidence in support of the effectiveness of reserves in helping the 
holding countries ease the trilemma. With a few exceptions, increases in the level of 
reserves relative to GDP do not appear to be associated with changes in any of the three 
trilemma goals at a reasonable level of statistical significance. In other words, reserve 
accumulation does not appear to be working—at least in terms of helping the holding 
countries escape the trilemma. 
 However, two notable exceptions to this general conclusion reinforce some of the 
previous findings in the literature. First, only the two countries with a recent history of 
fixed exchange rate regimes in the area (Argentina and Venezuela) showed evidence of 
gains in exchange rate stability associated with increases in relative reserves. A closer 
look at the Argentinean case suggested that in line with the traditional optimal reserve 
demand literature, gains in exchange stability from accumulating reserves accrue mostly 
in instances of hard pegs. Second, our findings suggest that only countries with high 
levels of reserves obtain benefits in terms of their capital account openness and monetary 
policy independence as a result of increases in holdings of foreign reserves. For instance, 
Peru—the only country in the region with reserves in excess of 21% of its GDP—is also 
the only country in our sample that appears to experience statistically significant 
increases in capital account openness and monetary policy independence as a result of an 
increase in relative reserves. This finding is in line with the evidence presented in 
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Aizenman et al. (2010) which claims that only in countries with reserves exceeding 21% 
of GDP do these reserves ease the trilemma. 
 Rather than definitively answering the question of whether reserves ‗work‘ or not, 
the findings presented in this chapter raise important questions for policymakers in terms 
of the appropriateness of reserve hoarding. While not conclusive, these findings do 
provide some evidence in support of the idea that reserve accumulation contributes to 
easing the trilemma only in instances when reserves are significantly large. For countries 
holding a more moderate level, reserves appear to provide little to no benefit, except in 
cases of hard pegs of their exchange rate. Policymakers must consider the opportunity 
cost as well as their country‘s ability and willingness to accumulate the high levels of 
reserves necessary to escape the trilemma. Moreover, it provides further impetus for the 
creation of mechanisms of regional support, such as reserve pools, which might allow 
countries to have access to larger stocks of reserves and hence surpass the apparent 
threshold of reserve effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSURING AGAINST NEIGHBORING CRISES: OPTIMAL RESERVE 
ACCUMULATION AND CONTAGION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the defining trends in international finance of the last two decades has been the 
unprecedented growth in the levels of international reserves accumulated by emerging 
nations. International reserves held by developing countries in 2007 were nearly 13 times 
as large as those in 1990. In a global financial system characterized by market failures 
and sudden stops, many developing countries have opted for the protection provided by 
individual accumulation of reserves as a second-best outcome.  However, as suggested by 
Rodrik (2006), the accumulation of reserves comes at a hefty (social) opportunity cost to 
the nations that hold them. It is this particular aspect that brings into question—or at least 
merits a re-examination of—the validity and efficiency of reserve accumulation as a 
stabilization and development strategy, particularly in the context of some cash-strapped 
developing nations. 
 A concurrent trend, and a direct response to this dilemma, has been the push for 
the creation of regional arrangements of cooperation throughout the developing world. 
Arguments in favor of these mechanisms have ranged from pure political and cultural ties 
to the benefits of risk-sharing and macro coordination. An important category of these 
regional mechanisms has involved the establishment of reserve pooling and foreign 
exchange swap arrangements. Institutions like the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) 
and the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in South East Asia have gained a new impetus in 
recent years. Moreover, these institutions have become an important component of the 
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International Monetary Fund‘s recent attempt to reshape itself to better deal with the 
―Global Imbalances‖ problem and with the much needed democratization of the Fund. In 
a recent speech about the future of the IMF, its Managing Director, Dominique Strauss-
Kahn (2010), had this to say about the role of regional reserve pooling arrangements: 
―…we might look at ways to collaborate with regional reserve pools. We 
certainly do not see such funds as ‗competitors.‘ Indeed, they can be a 
positive and stabilizing force in international financing—as exemplified 
by recent European Union lending in parallel with Fund programs. At its 
most ambitious, such collaboration could even include Fund resources 
serving as a backstop to regional pools.‖ 
 
 The literature on international reserves demand has addressed many of the key 
issues with respect to the motive, size adequacy, and, to a degree, potential alternatives to 
the current framework of reserve accumulation. However, and despite the extensive 
evidence of the prevalence of crisis contagion tendencies among emerging market 
countries, the literature has paid limited attention to the critical linkage between the 
optimal reserve demand decision and the potential risk associated with contagion. 
Traditional models of reserve demand have adopted a country-specific approach under 
which the optimal reserve demand function is determined partially in a vacuum. Thus, 
with a few exceptions (e.g. Agosin (2000), and a recent paper by Basu et, al. (2010)), the 
degree to which this decision is made based on external conditions, particularly those of 
neighboring countries, remains largely unexplored. 
 This chapter addresses the nexus between international reserve accumulation and 
the prevalence of contagion in Latin America by first identifying to what degree countries 
in the region are taking the risk of contagion (originating in neighboring countries) into 
their demand for reserves, if at all. In order to accomplish this task, a proxy for contagion 
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risk is first constructed based on previous models of exchange rate market pressure. 
Using cross-sectional time series data for the seven largest countries in Latin America 
and least squares estimation techniques, this chapter empirically identifies a significant 
positive effect of contagion risk on the growth rate of the accumulation of reserves. 
Based on this result, it places the effects of insuring against contagion risk in context, by 
estimating the cost of this additional level of insurance. Moreover, by employing the 
widely used method of coverage ratios, this chapter concludes with an exploration of the 
increased insurance coverage that may ensue from reductions in the countries‘ variability 
in the balance of payments. This decrease in variability is based on the premise that 
regional reserve pools reduce contagion risk, which in turn leads to more stable balance 
of payments. Simplified simulations based on different hypothetical levels of reduced 
variability are considered to calculate potential increases in insurance coverage. 
 The empirical identification of the role of contagion risk in the optimal demand 
for reserves has important policy implications. Latin American monetary authorities, 
looking to maintain a comparable level of protection against sudden stops and real market 
shocks, and to reduce the opportunity cost of holding reserves, would benefit from 
alternative strategies to the current model of ―self-insurance.‖ This chapter finds that the 
opportunity cost of the precautionary accumulation of reserves to deal with contagion risk 
is not negligible. Thus as previously argued by others in the literature and as illustrated in 
the last section of this chapter, counterciclycal policies like regional reserve pooling—
through a reduction in contagion risk and balance of payments volatility—can lead to 
significant efficiency gains in the optimal reserve accumulation process. 
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 The remainder of this chapter is as follows. The following section explores the 
literature on optimal reserve demand, contagion, and reserve pooling, and places the 
Latin American experience within the context of the recent rise in reserve accumulation. 
Section III develops a proxy variable for contagion risk, which is then used to empirically 
extend the traditional Buffer Stock Model. This section also details the methods used to 
estimate the gains from reserve pooling. Section IV presents the empirical findings. 
Section V concludes.  
 
3.2 Literature Review and Background 
3.2.1 Reserve Accumulation in Latin America 
If not at the same levels observed in East Asia, the accumulation of reserves in Latin 
America has dramatically increased in recent years. In 2007, the region‘s total reserves 
were almost 84 times those in 1970 in nominal terms. The aggregate reserves of the seven 
largest Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and 
Venezuela) reached $460 billion US Dollars in the third quarter of 2008; a significant 
figure by most standards. Among these countries Brazil, Mexico and Colombia 
experienced the most dramatic increase, while Venezuela, Chile and Ecuador saw their 
reserves increase at a more moderate rate (See Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1). 
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Table 3.1. Average Total International Foreign Reserves (1970=1) 
 1970-79 1980-89 1990-95 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 2006 2007 
Argentina 4.29 6.67 17.75 30.91 37.55 29.12 18.08 35.01 46.97 67.69 
Brazil 5.00 6.52 22.82 46.81 33.72 28.94 36.61 44.85 72.14 151.55 
Chile 1.78 8.59 26.94 43.11 39.82 37.60 39.81 42.04 49.52 43.00 
Colombia 6.57 19.36 35.56 47.88 40.67 46.45 52.52 68.75 74.50 101.11 
Mexico 2.28 8.31 21.21 32.00 42.12 53.16 72.55 91.47 100.96 115.35 
Peru 2.15 5.73 13.99 32.92 27.95 26.07 29.47 39.62 51.50 82.05 
Venezuela, RB 6.40 11.01 12.37 16.11 14.26 13.46 15.73 25.42 35.08 32.26 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 4.26 8.35 18.52 31.44 29.98 29.51 33.39 44.60 58.10 83.69 
  
 Source: Calculations based on WB’s GDF data 
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Figure 3.1. Latin American (Non-Gold) Foreign Reserves 
 
 
 The growth in reserves goes beyond its nominal level considerations, and is also 
evident in terms of the countries‘ short-term debt and imports—two critical variables 
when considering the precautionary role of reserves. The region overall has steadily 
increased its ratio of international reserves to short-term debt in the last four decades, 
with all the countries in the sample having ratios in excess of one by the end of 2007 (See 
Table 3.2). In contrast, before 1990 only three countries (Venezuela, Colombia and 
Chile) had reserves exceeding their short-term debt. This ratio is significant not only 
because it serves as a strong signal of a country‘s ability to meet its debt obligations in 
the upcoming year, but also because this measure is being explicitly used by country 
officials as part of the management process of their reserves (IMF (2001)). Accelerated 
efforts to increase foreign reserve holdings following the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), 
along with a conscious attempt at restructuring the external debt in favor of longer term 
commitments have reduced the apparent vulnerability of the region, at least in terms of   
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Table 3.2. Reserves/Short-Term Debt 
 1970-79 1980-89 1990-95 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 2006-07 
Argentina 1.43 0.61 1.10 0.77 0.85 0.81 0.67 0.77 1.08 
Brazil 1.92 0.64 0.92 1.57 1.36 1.17 1.81 2.17 4.41 
Chile 0.75 1.46 3.24 2.75 3.31 2.58 2.45 2.27 1.66 
Colombia 0.92 1.81 2.65 1.70 1.72 3.13 3.02 2.53 3.56 
Mexico 0.72 0.84 0.59 0.85 1.27 2.48 5.77 9.16 10.04 
Peru 0.72 0.87 0.77 1.72 1.78 2.59 3.91 4.50 5.29 
Venezuela, RB 4.34 2.11 4.18 5.02 4.69 1.75 2.21 2.97 2.99 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
1.52 0.85 1.00 1.36 1.40 1.54 2.10 2.32 3.09 
Source: Calculations based on WB’s GDF data 
 
Table 3.3. Reserves in Months of Imports 
 1970-79 1980-89 1990-95 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 2006-07 
Argentina 9.78 4.11 5.71 5.68 6.25 5.28 5.47 6.50 7.83 
Brazil 4.63 2.83 6.25 7.49 5.19 4.36 6.18 5.60 8.78 
Chile 3.21 5.13 8.21 7.82 7.76 6.83 6.91 4.41 3.06 
Colombia 5.14 6.55 7.18 5.85 5.73 6.22 6.62 6.13 5.12 
Mexico 1.60 2.09 2.28 2.24 2.33 2.33 3.24 3.36 3.13 
Peru 3.99 4.64 6.59 10.35 9.77 9.15 9.62 8.66 8.81 
Venezuela, RB 9.45 8.97 9.02 9.78 7.47 6.29 10.29 10.13 7.98 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 5.78 3.67 4.57 5.01 4.25 3.76 4.55 4.56 5.13 
Source: Calculations based on WB’s GDF data 
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meeting its short-term debt obligations. Thus by 2007, countries like Mexico, Peru and 
Brazil found themselves in a position to potentially cover over 10, 5 and 4 times, 
respectively, their short-term debt requirements by using their accumulated international 
reserves. Moreover, it is important to note that according to the widely-cited Guidotti-
Greenspan rule of reserve adequacy (Greenspan (1999))
13
; all countries in the sample 
hold massive excess reserves.  
 If reserves are seen through a precautionary lens, countries—especially the less-
developed ones—would be expected to be concerned about securing the continuous flow 
of critical imports. In case of a crisis, international reserves, if available, could be relied 
upon to temporarily stabilize imports by allowing countries to fulfill their needs in the 
international markets with acceptable foreign currency. Consequently, the number of 
months of imports that international reserves could potentially cover is an important 
indicator of reserve adequacy. Growing integration into the world markets by countries in 
the region has meant a significant increase in their level of imports. Therefore, as imports 
grow along with foreign reserves, this indicator has remained relatively stable for the 
region overall: around 4-5 months of imports (See Table 3.3). The sample countries with 
the strongest performance in terms of this indicator by 2007 include Brazil, Peru, and 
Venezuela. 
 
3.2.2 Optimal Reserve Demand 
The economics literature on the demand for international reserves can be loosely divided 
into reserve accumulation driven by mercantilist and precautionary motives. Proponents 
                                                 
13
 This rule of thumb states that countries should hold levels of reserves equal to their short-term external 
debt.  
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of the mercantilist approach to reserve demand argue that the recent accumulation of 
reserves by developing countries can be best explained by conscious efforts by their 
monetary authorities to maintain an undervalued currency, and thereby increase the 
competitiveness of their exporting industries (e.g. Dooley et al. 2005). Evidence from the 
case of China—with reserves nearing U$2.5 Trillion by the end of 2009 and a largely 
undervalued Renminbi—and other South East Asian nations seems to give some validity 
to this view. 
 On the other hand, the precautionary view of reserve accumulation is based on the 
idea that countries accumulate savings in the forms of reserves to deal with the 
uncertainties that may arise from sudden-stop episodes and other balance of payments 
shocks. The precautionary motive approach remains the focus of the reserve demand 
literature, and as such, it has closely resembled the main tenets of the quantity theory of 
money. From the precautionary point of view, reserves are seen to serve three critical 
roles: 1) provision of liquidity during shocks to the balance of payments, or during 
national emergencies, 2) reduction in adjustment costs following a crisis, and 3) boosting 
confidence in the finances of the local economy, and thus contributing to the deterrence 
of potential speculative attacks. 
 Cooper (1968) highlights the role of reserves in providing short-term policy space 
to countries facing balance of payments shocks and thus reducing and/or delaying the 
implementation of painful expenditure switching and expenditure reduction measures. 
Financial crises in developing countries, including Latin American ones, tend to be 
accompanied by costly disruptions to their economies, such as low or negative economic 
growth, growing unemployment rates, declining terms of trade, deterioration in the debt 
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structure, among others. Thus, reserves are seen as a countercyclical buffer aimed at 
minimizing the potential damage to the domestic economy, either by deterring a crisis 
from happening, or by alleviating the negative consequences when one does occur. 
  However, along with these important benefits, there is a significant opportunity 
cost attached that must also be considered when demanding foreign reserves. By their 
precautionary nature, foreign reserves are typically in the form of very liquid, safe assets 
(e.g. US Treasury securities) with corresponding low yields. In the meantime, many Latin 
American countries are increasingly recurring to the international financial markets for 
the financing of their public and private economic activities by issuing high yield 
securities (e.g. Brady Bonds). The gap between the yield structures of the assets and 
liabilities held by developing countries‘ central banks accounts for the opportunity cost of 
reserves
14
.  Heller (1966) first provided a model based on a cost minimization problem, 
where the monetary authorities select an optimal level of reserves to minimize the costs 
(adjustment and opportunity costs) that may arise from a crisis event.     
 While the concept of opportunity cost within the context of reserve demand was 
first introduced by Heller (1966), it was Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981), who building 
upon this work, developed the ―buffer stock‖ model. This model, which to this day 
provides the basic framework for most empirical studies of reserve demand, directly 
reflects the maximization problem stated above. In the buffer stock model, changes in 
reserve holdings dR (t) follow a Wiener process (driven by the stochastic process that 
governs payments and receipts). Monetary authorities face a cost minimization problem, 
where cost consists of the expected adjustment cost associated with the occurrence of a 
                                                 
14 Bahmani-Oskooee and Brown (2002) provide an extensive review of the literature of optimal 
reserve demand. 
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crisis event and the opportunity cost of holding reserves. Therefore, monetary authorities 
select their initial level of reserves (R0) in order to minimize this expected aggregate cost. 
Adjustments are necessary when the level of reserves reaches a lower bound, which for 
the sake of simplicity is assumed to be zero. Solving for the optimal stock of reserves 
yields, Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) derive the following equation: 
ln R = b0 + b1 lnσ + b2 lnr + u, 
Where σ is a volatility measure of reserves, r accounts for the opportunity cost of holding 
reserves, and u is the error term. Based on the theoretical model, the predictions are that 
b1 = 0.50 and b2 = -0.25. Moreover, Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) conducted regression 
estimations of the model above for a panel of 22 developed countries for the 1971-1975-
period. They calculated the variable σ as the standard error of the trend-adjusted changes 
in reserves, while the opportunity cost, r, was captured using data for the government 
bond yield. Their empirical findings show the coefficients to be of the right sign, 
significant, and similar in magnitude to the predictions (b1=0.505, b2 =-0.279). In line 
with the earlier theoretical work in Triffin (1961) and Olivera (1969)—both of which had 
proposed the level of trade (represented by imports) as a determinant of reserve 
demand—Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) extend their structural specification to: 
 ln R = b0 + b1 lnσ + b2 lnr + b3 lnM + u, where M accounts for the level of imports. 
 
 The level of reserves demanded is expected to be positively correlated with 
imports, through a precautionary channel (Olivera) in which countries with larger imports 
face higher potential adjustment costs. Frenkel and Jovanovic‘s empirical testing of this 
structural extension to the original buffer stock model found a positive (and significant) 
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elasticity of demand for reserves with respect to imports (b3=0.352), while the elasticity 
of demand for reserves with respect to the variability and opportunity cost measures 
retained its original signs and significance (b1=0.676, b2=-0.233). 
 While the mercantilist motive seems to have played a role in the unprecedented 
accumulation of reserves in East Asia, Aizenman and Lee (2007) and Perez (2009) argue 
that the empirical evidence for the Latin America does not support the idea that reserve 
accumulation in the region is primarily the result of exchange rate manipulations. 
Moreover, when it comes to Latin America, there appears to be a widely-held consensus 
in the literature that supports the idea that foreign reserve demand by Latin American 
countries is more in line with the traditional precautionary motive first advanced by 
Heller (1966). With that in mind, the remainder of this chapter will concentrate on the 
treatment of reserve accumulation from the point of view of insurance protection against 
potential costly crisis events, without entirely dismissing potential mercantilist reasons. In 
any event, mercantilist reasons can arguably be subsumed under the precautionary motive 
if one assumes that the sustainability of a stable (and positive) current account would help 
avert some of the crises previously mentioned. 
 
3.2.3 Contagion and the Precautionary Motive  
The literature on the optimal demand for reserves has paid limited attention to the linkage 
between reserves demand and the risk of contagion. In order to test this contagion risk as 
an explanatory variable on the demand for reserves, we must first consider the separate, 
but extensive, literature on contagion. Interest in contagion in international markets 
(especially those of emerging countries) reached its apex soon after the Asian Financial 
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Crisis of the late 1990s, and has only regained prevalence in the last year due to the 
recent fears associated with the sovereign bonds markets of some Mediterranean 
members of the European Union. However, while interest in the topic has partially 
winded down since the late 1990s, several key aspects of contagion and the methods used 
to measure it remain mostly unresolved. As stated above, this chapter aims to explore the 
relationship between contagion risk and the optimal reserve accumulation decision from a 
precautionary motive point of view. In particular, it seeks to account for the effects that 
the risk of contagion (mainly originating from neighboring countries) has, or should 
have, on the level of accumulation of reserves of each country. Unlike the ―first 
generation‖ crises of the 1980s in Latin America, which can be directly traced to the 
financial decisions of individual countries, contagion crises can occur regardless of the 
strong state of a country‘s own fundamentals. This chapter assesses the effects of the risk 
associated with contagion crises by endogenizing this risk into the traditional 
specification of the buffer stock model outlined above. Table 3.4 presents prima facie 
evidence of the co-cyclicality of exports and the risk premium faced by countries in the 
region. 
 Before exploring this aspect any further, it is necessary to revisit the literature to 
identify what is meant by contagion. In its coarsest form, contagion in the context of 
financial crisis has come to be understood as a dominoes effect under which even 
relatively healthy economies can face painful crisis episodes resulting from economic 
shocks in other economies; in many cases regardless of their own fundamentals.
15
 Forbes  
                                                 
15 Although as it became clear during the Asian Financial Crisis with the spread of the crisis to 
Brazil and Russia, contagion is not limited to a country’s neighbors. However, this type of event 
would be best characterized as “Shift Contagion” in the Forbes and Rigobon (2001) sense. 
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Table 3.4 . Correlation Matrices (1999-2009)* 
 
Exports Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela 
Argentina ----- 0.97 0.91 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.29 
  
 
            
Brazil 0.97 ----- 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.39 
  (26.59) 
 
          
Chile 0.91 0.92 ----- 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.49 
  (13.03) (14.76) 
 
        
Colombia 0.99 0.97 0.93 ----- 0.97 0.98 0.30 
  (36.8) (25.51) (15.18) 
 
      
Mexico 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97 ----- 0.98 0.45 
  (21.62) (25.32) (20.49) (25.86) 
 
    
Peru 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 ----- 0.43 
  (22.23) (27.53) (23.88) (27.04) (34.62) 
 
  
Venezuela 0.29 0.39 0.49 0.30 0.45 0.43 ----- 
  (1.83) (2.54) (3.45) (1.89) (3.08) (2.92) 
 
        
EMBI Spread Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela 
Argentina ----- 
        
       Brazil 0.61 ----- 
       (4.54) 
      Chile -0.09 0.38 ----- 
      -(.51) (2.39) 
     Colombia 0.46 0.87 0.57 ----- 
     (3.11) (10.6) (4.13) 
    Mexico 0.18 0.69 0.81 0.89 ----- 
    (1.08) (5.59) (8.3) (11.6) 
   Peru 0.36 0.85 0.62 0.96 0.91 ----- 
   (2.27) (9.72) (4.73) (20.09) (12.77) 
  Venezuela 0.37 0.62 0.84 0.75 0.85 0.74 ----- 
  (2.39) (4.73) (9.26) (6.69) (9.75) (6.59) 
 
        Source: Author‘s calculations based on IMF‘s IFS Database 
* T-values in parentheses. The values in bold are significant at the 10% level. 
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and Rigobon (2001) provide a useful and widely-cited taxonomy of the main approaches 
to contagion in the literature. They differentiate interdependence approaches to contagion 
from those dealing with ―shift-contagion‖. Interdependency contagion is defined as the 
extension of a crisis episode from one country to another without a structural change in 
the co-movement of their fundamentals. It represents a risk that is derived from the 
endemic and pre-existing relations among the countries involved. On the other hand, shift 
contagion is defined as a structural change in the co-variance of the fundamentals 
between the countries involved as a result of a crisis episode. These linkages can be 
measured as the correlation in asset returns, the probability of speculative attack, or the 
transmission of shocks or volatility.  
 Furthermore, Forbes and Rigobon (2001) classify the literature on the propagation 
of shocks into crisis-contingent and non-crisis-contingent theories. The first set of 
theories is in accordance with the ―shift-contagion‖ approach, and consists in the 
transmission of crisis shocks through mechanisms of multiple equilibria (i.e. investor 
psychology), endogenous liquidity (i.e. reduced liquidity leading to portfolio re-
composition), and political contagion (i.e. changes in fixed exchange rate regimes as a 
result of changes in other countries.) These mechanisms of transmission of shocks are 
based on a structural change in the relationship between the affected countries. As such, 
they represent a new method of crisis transmission, which does not exist before the onset 
of the crisis. As suggested by its name, the second set of theories, non-crisis-contagion 
theories, encompasses all theories in which a crisis is not necessary for the shock 
transmission process to take place. Therefore, this set of theories is in line with what 
Forbes and Rigobon (2001) described as ‗interdependence‘. The channels of transmission 
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remain constant with or without the occurrence of a crisis episode. They include trade 
(e.g. devaluations), policy coordination, re-evaluation/learning by investors (i.e. 
application of lessons learned in one country to another similar country), and random 
aggregate/global (exogenous) shocks (e.g. a rise in the international interest rate). While 
these categorizations are important, contagion risk, whether it originates from either shift-
contagion or from interdependence, exerts significant costs on individual countries. 
Moreover, as argued by Machinea and Rozenwurcel (2006), the information asymmetries 
and herding behavior that characterize ―shift-contagion‖ also tend to intensify the 
interdependence among countries in the region.     
 The existing literature on contagion (under alternative definitions and 
measurements) provides ample empirical evidence for the prevalence of this phenomenon 
in Latin America. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) conclude that capital flows to four small 
Latin American countries depend on standard determinants, and a contagion proxy 
(consisting of the capital flows to four large countries in the region). Moreover, using 
data for weekly stock market returns for selected Latin American and Asian countries, 
they find that correlation coefficients increased among Latin American countries and 
decreased between Latin American and Asian countries following the December 1994 
Mexican Peso devaluation. The authors conclude that this finding provides further 
evidence that contagion is highly regional in nature. Similarly, Glick and Rose (1999) 
claim that the trade linkages and patterns that prevail in a region due to geographic 
proximity are important in propagating a crisis, and consequently contribute to contagion 
propagation at the regional level. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that the conditional 
probability of a crisis in a Latin American country (when one or several other Latin 
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American countries already face a crisis) is as high as seventy-eight percent. Burki and 
Edwards (1996) looked at contagion in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile and 
Colombia as a result of the Mexican crisis, and found that contagion was present, but 
selective. 
 
3.2.4 Reserve Pooling 
The events that surrounded the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s, including the 
prevalence of contagion, showed that the current international financial institutions and 
the overall global financial structure remain inadequately designed to address the hazards 
of globalization that afflict developing nations
16
. Consequently, along with the exorbitant 
growth in the accumulation of reserves, many developing countries have opted for the 
promotion of alternative arrangements of coordination and balance of payments support 
at the regional level. Some of these mechanisms range from simple bilateral swap 
arrangements of hard currency (e.g. the Chiang Mai Initiative) to a more formal pooling 
of foreign reserves. In the Latin American context, the well-established Latin American 
Reserve Fund (FLAR), and the nascent Bank of the South (BOS)
17
 are the two 
institutions that exemplify the continuous push for the regionalization of the reserve 
accumulation process (see Rosero and Erten (2010)).  
 Some in the literature, while supportive of the tenets of regional cooperation, have 
expressed valid reservations about the feasibility of reserve pooling mechanisms in Latin 
America. For example, Machinea and Rozenwurcel (2006) argue that regional 
                                                 
16 Ocampo (2000) and Stiglitz (2002) provide an extensive treatment of this view. 
17 While the Bank of the South was recently established as a development bank, its role as a 
regional insurance provider (against balance of payments crises) remains central to the agenda of 
most of its founders.  
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cooperation in the region (including reserve pooling) faces significant obstacles. Chiefly 
among them is the relative—to the European Union—lack of existing interdependence as 
manifested by the low levels of intraregional trade and financial links, as well as the 
tendency of Latin American countries to try to differentiate themselves from their 
neighbors following a crisis—in an attempt to avoid being bunched together by 
unknowledgeable investors. For the case of the FLAR, Eichengreen (2007) concludes 
that in order for this reserve pool to effectively serve as a lender of last resort during the 
occurrence of sudden stops, it must overcome key challenges like the loss of insurance 
coverage for some countries that would ensue from the pooling of reserves among low-
variability and high-variability countries. Consequently, he argues that the FLAR‘s 
resources would be better utilized to purchase ―contingent debt securities issued by Latin 
American governments and corporations: domestic-currency inflation-indexed bonds, 
GDP-indexed bonds, commodity-price-indexed bonds.‖ 
 Notwithstanding these concerns, and as shown by the recent interest of the IMF in 
the concept, there is strong support in the literature for the creation of mechanisms of 
regional coordination and support like reserve pooling. The rationalization for the 
creation of these mechanisms has been based on principles well summarized in Ocampo 
(2006), among others. For instance, according to Ocampo the rise of ―open regionalism‖ 
that has accompanied globalization has intensified the degree at which externalities from 
the macroeconomic policies of one country can affect its neighbors in the area. Thus, in 
line with arguments presented in this chapter, he states that policies that only address the 
problems of an individual country (while ignoring the effects on its neighbors) are likely 
to result in outcomes that aggravate contagion (e.g. reduced regional trade and 
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competitive devaluations). Moreover, he argues that as globalization continues to 
undermine the policy space of individual countries‘ economic decision-making, it is at 
the regional level that countries are able to retain some of their ―policy autonomy‖. The 
author argues that International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the IMF might face 
diseconomies of scale in the provision of financial services (e.g. crisis prevention and 
resolution). In contrast, regional and subregional financial institutions—serving as 
subsidiaries to the IMF—would be better equipped to deal with localized problems. 
Finally, Ocampo suggests that increased competition in the provision of financial services 
would be beneficial for small and medium-size countries, whose current power in dealing 
with IFIs is very limited because of their size. Moreover, regional institutions enjoy an 
increased level of ―ownership‖ by its small member countries. This contrasts with the 
current financial structure under which the voice of small nations is mostly negligible. 
 In addition to the arguments above, Agosin (2000) makes a normative argument 
for partial pooling of reserves in Latin America based on contagion. Within the context of 
―third generation‖ crises, he argues that by protecting a country from a crisis occurrence, 
regional monetary institutions produce valuable positive externalities to other countries in 
the region. Mistry (1999) proposes regional institutions as ―mezzanine bulwarks‖ of crisis 
response between national and global response mechanisms, which are critical to reduce 
―…the short- and long-term ‗neigbourhood costs‘ of crisis mismanagements by 
international financial institutions throughout the developing world.‖ He argues that 
regional crisis containment mechanisms are well suited to restrain the spread of contagion 
through coordinated prevention (e.g. supervision and macroeconomic policy 
synchronicity) and response. Mistry purports that the ability to respond in unified manner 
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creates a credible front of defense against speculation, limits the extent of trade and 
financial markets disruptions and avoids competitive devaluations among neighboring 
countries.  
 As presented in the first section of this chapter, Latin American countries have 
embraced the precautionary role of reserves and have accumulated significant resources 
to deal with the vagaries of the international financial markets. Thus, while relying on the 
normative arguments presented above, this chapter empirically links the role of contagion 
risk to the optimal accumulation of reserves, and thus provides additional impetus for the 
creation of regional reserve pools and similar mechanisms of crisis prevention and 
response. Moreover, aside from the regional cooperation benefits that derive from the 
correction of coordination failures, and which others have previously outlined in the 
literature, reserve pooling, by internalizing the risk of contagion into the individual 
demand for reserves, can increase the level of insurance coverage and/or decrease the 
opportunity cost of precautionary accumulation.  
 
3.3 Methodology 
This chapter tests the effects of contagion on the demand for international reserves. The 
analysis is divided in two parts. First, it empirically extends the traditional Buffer Stock 
model by introducing a proxy for contagion risk. Next, it carries out the results from this 
extension to illustrate the potential efficiency gains from hypothetical reductions in 
variability associated with regional reserve pooling. Data for some of the variables of 
interest, especially that of the spread of the Emerging Bond Market Index, are not widely 
available pre-1999. This limits the number of quarterly observations available per country 
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to forty-two. To overcome this problem and to gain richness in the analysis, regressions 
in this chapter are conducted using pooled series for the seven countries under 
consideration—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Venezuela. Unless 
otherwise stated, the data employed in this chapter ranges from Q1-99 to Q1-09, and thus 
coincides with the period that followed the Asian Financial Crisis and the subsequent 
crises that took place throughout Latin America. Appendix C presents the descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in this analysis. 
 
3.3.1 A Proxy for Contagion 
In order to endogenize contagion risk into the optimal demand for reserves, it is 
necessary to account for the presence and extent of the risk originating from abroad. 
While there is not a universal method of identifying and measuring contagion, several 
attempts have been made in the literature to empirically address this question. 
Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz (1996) provides a good starting framework. Using panel 
quarterly data (Q1-59 to Q4-93) for twenty industrialized countries, Eichengreen et, al. 
address the question of ―by how much does the probability of a currency crisis taking 
place in a country i in period t change as a result of the presence of a currency crisis in a 
different country j at time t?‖ Even after several checks for sensitivity analysis, they 
conclude that ―A speculative attack elsewhere in the world is associated with an 
increased probability of a domestic currency crisis by around eight percentage points‖.  
 The first step in identifying the increased probability of a currency crisis taking 
place, as a result of a crisis elsewhere, involves determining what is meant by a crisis 
episode. Eichengreen et, al. start by arguing that not all potential currency crises 
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materialize because in some instances central banks are able to deter them by running 
down their stocks of reserves, devaluing the currency (abandoning/relaxing currency 
controls), and/or increasing the interest rate. Thus, they propose a weighted exchange 
market pressure index (EMP), such that: 
EMPi,t = [(α%Δei,t) + (βΔ(ii,t – iG,t)) – (λ(%Δri,t - %ΔrG,t))] 
where ei,t is the price of a unit of the center country currency in terms of country i‘s 
currency, iG,t is the short-term interest rate of the center country, and rG,t is the reserve 
ratio (reserves/M1) of the center country. Coefficients α, β, λ are weights. Moreover, in 
order to normalize the variances of the three factors, the weights α, β, λ are set such that  
α=1, β  
  Δ      –       
    Δ      
 ,  λ   
     Δ      Δ      
    Δ      
 
Crisis episodes are identified as significant deviations of the EMP from its mean value. 
The binary crisis variable is thus obtained: 
Crisisi,t = 1 if EMPi,t > 1.5 EMP + µEMP 
                                                        = 0 otherwise 
Where µ and   are the sample and standard deviation of the EMP. To avoid double 
counting, Eichengreen et, al. suggest applying a one-period exclusion window, which 
implies that in case in which a crisis episode is immediately followed by another crisis 
episode, the latter is dropped.
18
  
 The research presented here identifies 22 crisis episodes in the region (Figure 3.2) 
by adapting Eichengreen et, al.‘s methodology and using quarterly data for seven Latin 
American countries in the sample for the Q1-97 to Q1-09 period (49 quarters per 
                                                 
18 The same one-period exclusion window is applied to tranquil periods. 
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country). However, unlike their specification, which used Germany as the center country, 
the application of the index to the Latin American context in this chapter is done using 
the US as the center country—given the strong trade and financial links between the 
region and the US, as well as the relative stability of the US dollar. Moreover, as seen in 
Figure 3.2, this index captures the significant exchange market pressure felt in the region 
before and during the 1999 Brazilian currency crisis and the 2001-2002 Argentinean 
crisis, as well as the exchange rate pressure resulting from the latest global crisis (see Q4-
08). The three quarters between Q2-98 and Q1-99 experienced 8 non-consecutive crises 
in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Similarly, the intensification of the 
Argentine crises that accompanied the elimination of the Peso-Dollar Parity in January 
2002 seems to have been associated with 7 non-consecutive crisis episodes in Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela.  
Figure 3.2. Crises Episodes 
 
 
 Given the limitations in terms of the time coverage of the data (and thus its 
limited variation) used in this analysis, it is not possible to reach a conclusive result for 
the level of contagion risk as the one obtained through the probit model specified by 
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Eichengreen et, al. However, the pressure index values obtained and the consequent 
identification of common crisis episodes do provide partial support for the hypothesis of 
contagion prevalence in the region. More importantly, the values of the exchange rate 
market pressure index allow for the quantification of potential crisis tendencies in 
neighboring countries, even if only within the context of currency crises. If as previously 
suggested in the literature, Latin American crises tend to be contagious in nature, high 
positive EMP values in neighboring countries suggest that a crisis has or is likely to 
happen in the region. Therefore high EMP values in the rest of the region can arguably be 
used to proxy contagion risk, and thus should be expected to be associated with larger 
current levels of reserves. 
 As suggested above, the exchange market pressure index provides the basis for 
the creation of a proxy index for contagion. However, rather than using direct levels of 
the EMP index, the variable CONTAGION used in this empirical estimation consists of 
the aggregate of number of standard deviations from their individual mean for each of the 
countries in the sample other than country i.
19
 That is, 
              
                   
  
    
 
where        is the EMP value for country j at time t, while             and    are respectively 
the mean and standard deviation of the EMP series for country j during the sample period 
(Q1-97 to Q1-09).  
                                                 
19 The use of standard deviations is preferred to actual EMP values because the former allows us 
to retain the relative degree of pressure faced by individual countries, which otherwise is lost 
when aggregating across countries.  
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 Therefore, this measure of contagion risk is equivalent to the aggregate of the z-
scores for the EMP values of neighboring countries included in the sample. A large 
number of the aggregate of standard deviations suggests large pressure on the exchange 
rate of neighboring countries, and can thus signal deteriorating conditions in the region, 
which arguably raise the potential for crisis at home. Consequently, under a precautionary 
approach to reserve accumulation, a high value of CONTAGION is expected to be 
positively associated with the growth level of reserves demanded.  
 
3.3.2 Buffer Stock Model Revisited 
The increasing interconnectedness in terms of trade and financial flows that has prevailed 
in the past few decades necessitates a reformulation of the traditional models of 
international reserve demand. The buffer stock model by Frenkel and Jovanovic provides 
a realistic theoretical framework for accumulation of reserves from a precautionary 
approach. However, like most of the literature on optimal reserve demand, it fails to fully 
capture the potential risks that may originate from outside the country being studied. In a 
world of open economies, the precautionary role of reserves cannot stop at the borders of 
the country in question. In plain terms, getting fire insurance against your house is no 
longer sufficient if your neighbor‘s house now directly abuts yours. This reality became 
increasingly evident during the East Asian financial crisis, as well as the recent 
experiences in Brazil and Russia. 
 The buffer stock model addresses the accumulation of foreign reserves based on 
their implicit insurance role against crises. As traditionally stated, empirical 
specifications of this model do not address the presence of contagion risk, which go 
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above and beyond the idiosyncratic risk faced by each country. Contagion, as recent 
crises from Asia, Latin America, and Europe have shown, can wreak havoc on the 
economies of neighboring countries, which in some instances turn out to be innocent 
bystanders. Given the large potential adjustment costs that are associated with the spread 
of a crisis (e.g. a balance of payments, currency, and/or banking crisis), it seems 
theoretically necessary to incorporate this risk factor into the traditional specification of 
the buffer stock model in order to avoid omitted variable bias. Thus, the basic structural 
extension proposed in this chapter is such that: 
lnReservesi,t = β0 + β1lnvari,t + β2lnEMBIi,t + β3lnVULNERABILITYi,t + β4 CONTAGIONi,t + µt      
 All variables (with the exception of CONTAGION) in this empirical specification 
are expressed in logarithmic terms. The variable CONTAGION is kept in levels in order 
to retain its economic meaning. The dependent variable lnreserves accounts for the 
natural log of the stock of total reserves, excluding gold, for each country under 
consideration. Data for this variable is measured in millions of current of US Dollars and 
is obtained from the IMF‘s International Financial Statistics database. In line with the 
original specification in Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981), the first regressor, lnvar, serves as 
a proxy of idiosyncratic country risk by tracking the natural log of the variance of 
reserves. This variance is calculated based on an eight-quarter moving average, of the de-
trended level of total reserves (excluding gold), which in turn is obtained using a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. Higher variance in the level of reserves in previous periods is 
assumed to implicitly capture the risk associated with the economy being insured, and 
thus it is expected to be positively correlated with the current level of demand for 
reserves.  
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 Unlike Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981), who use government bond yields as a 
proxy for the opportunity cost of holding reserves, the specification used here relies on 
the Emerging Bond Market Index Plus (EMBI) spread to account for this cost. The 
natural log of the EMBI spread, measured in basis points, captures the gap between the 
total returns on sovereign debt instruments (e.g. Brady Bonds, Euro Bonds, etc.) from 
emerging countries and the total rate of return on risk-free US Treasury bills of 
comparable maturity terms. Countries with a high lnEMBI spread face relatively higher 
cost of finance in international markets. As most emerging countries, Latin American 
nations tend to have low private and public savings rates, which coupled with a restricted 
tax base tends to make their governments net international debtors. The difference 
between what emerging markets have to pay in order to borrow abroad (i.e. the return on 
sovereign bonds) and the return that they get on their savings (i.e. especially the yield on 
US treasury securities) is particularly relevant for countries which are indirectly financing 
their reserve holdings by issuing debt of their own. Therefore, as in previous studies, it is 
expected that higher opportunity costs are negatively associated with the level of reserves 
demanded. EMBI+ Spread data was obtained using the EMBI+ index developed by 
JPMorgan and by calculating quarterly averages. 
 Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) used the level of imports as a measure of the size of 
the asset to be covered. That is, in the event of a crisis, the value of imports is used as a 
measure of the level of coverage that reserves should provide. However, the liberalization 
of the capital accounts of developing countries (including those in Latin America) makes 
this measure obsolete. As argued in Titelman et, al. (2008), unlike the crises of the 1970s 
and 1980s, recent crises in Latin America tend to be financial in nature. With increased 
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exposure to foreign financial flows, the reversal of net capital inflows (sudden stop) has a 
large potential to wreak havoc on the domestic economy. Thus, a measure of the asset to 
be covered by reserves should also include the net capital flows of the country. The 
variable lnVULNERABILITY in this context is analogous to the scalar variable lnM 
introduced in the original buffer stock model specification. In addition to the level of 
imports, the variable lnVULNERABILITY accounts for the aggregate of net portfolio 
investment and foreign direct investment inflows. Data on the natural log of net portfolio 
and foreign direct investment capital inflows and imports is available from IMF‘s IFS 
database and is measured in millions of current US Dollars. Given the insurance 
perspective of the buffer stock model, it is expected that the larger the natural log of 
aggregate of imports, net portfolio and foreign direct investment capital inflows, the 
larger the amount of reserves demanded.  
 An alternative measure for asset coverage from reserve accumulation is a 
country‘s short-term debt obligations. Several authors (e.g. Bussiere and Mulder (1999)) 
have previously found short-term debt to be a positive and significant predictor of the 
level of reserves demanded. In order to test this alternative specification, Models 2, 2a 
and 2b include the variable lnOBLI. This variable is equal to the aggregate of short-term 
debt obligations and imports. Short-term debt is defined as the total (public and private) 
debt obligations with an original maturity of one year or less. Data for this variable was 
obtained from the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) component of the 
Quarterly External Debt (QEDS) dataset compiled by the IMF and the World Bank. Data 
limitations for this variable preclude the inclusion of Venezuela in the estimations of the 
second set of specifications.  
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 Finally, and in line with previous work in the literature, Models 1b and 2b account 
for the presence of barriers to the free floating of exchange rates. Using data from the 
IMF‘s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, a 
dummy variable for the de facto exchange rate regime is created. Countries classified by 
this report as free floaters are assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise. Traditionally, 
it has been proposed that countries with free-floating exchange rate mechanisms benefit 
from the automatic adjustments that occur through changes in the real exchange rate, and 
thus by definition require fewer reserves to adjust to external shocks. Therefore, it is 
assumed that the floatingD variable is negatively correlated with the dependent variable 
lnReserves. 
 A Fisher test, as developed in Maddala and Wu (1999), shows that with the 
exception of CONTAGION, all of the variables considered have unit roots when 
measured in levels and are stationary of degree 1 (see Appendix D). Based on these 
findings, first-difference least square estimations with time fixed effects are conducted 
based on the extended models outlined above. The time fixed effects specification is 
included to account for those shocks which are common to all countries, but which 
change across time. Moreover, by running the model in differences, the country fixed 
effects are implicitly eliminated from the estimation, and thus are not included in this 
empirical exercise. 
 
3.3.3 Estimating the Effects of Contagion and the Benefits of Reserve Pooling 
The estimated coefficients for the variable CONTAGION from the model specifications 
outlined above provide a parameter for the partial effect that contagion risk has on the 
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growth rate of reserves demanded. It is possible to build upon this finding to establish a 
basic estimate of the amount of reserves that countries have been accumulating as part of 
their protection mechanism against contagion risk. This theoretical exercise, presented in 
the following section, illustrates the tangible effects of the cost of the precautionary 
accumulation of reserves associated with contagion risk. 
 To take the analysis a logical step further, while connecting it to the literature on 
regional coordination, we estimate the hypothetical gains from reserve pooling in Latin 
America. A traditional method of assessing the benefits of reserve pooling in the 
literature has been through the calculations of coverage ratios (e.g. Dodsworth (1992), 
Eichengreen (2007), Rajan et, al. (2003)) based on the Theory of Clubs as developed by 
Buchanan (1965). Under autarky, each country faces a given coverage ratio, Ci, based on 
its level of liquidity and the variation of its balance of payments, such that  
    
                  
      
 
Where Ri is the average level of reserves of country i, and Var Ri is the variation of 
reserves expressed as the standard deviation for a given period (Q1-1999 to Q1-2009 in 
this case). Under a pooling arrangement the coverage ratio, Cpi, can be expressed as 
    
                        
                      
 
The term ρ accounts for degree of reserve pooling (0≤ ρ ≤1). Reserve pooling 
mechanisms are beneficial to a country as long as the coverage ratio it faces as a result of 
pooling is lower than that faced under autarky (Cpi > CAi). A replication of this simplified 
method for a pool made up of the seven largest countries in Latin America is presented in 
the following section.  
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 As argued by others in the literature (e.g. Ocampo (2006) and Mistry (1999)), 
mechanisms of reserve pooling, by providing enhanced liquidity and coordinated 
responses and monitoring, are likely to reduce the risk of contagion occurring at the 
regional level. Reduced contagion risk, along with an expanded toolbox of crisis 
response, is likely to lower variability in the balance of payments of member countries. 
Unfortunately, at present there are limited formal empirical estimations of the true 
relationship between the level of reserve pooling and the variability of reserves. Thus an 
extended cost-benefit analysis of the decision to join a pool by individual countries is 
necessary, and will be addressed in future research. However, in the meantime it is useful 
to build upon the coverage ratio method described above by accounting for hypothetical 
reductions in variability that might result from decreased contagion risk. Coverage ratios 
under alternative scenarios of variability reduction are calculated for each country as 
follows, 
     
                            
                           
 
where τ accounts for different multiples of hypothetical percentage reductions in the 
variability of the denominator, such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ 0.1. In lieu of a formal relationship, this 
hypothetical framework, based on a simplified linear relationship, allows for the 
illustration of potential improvements in coverage ratios that would emerge from reserve 
pooling (           . The next section of this chapter presents simulations based on 
different hypothetical levels of reduced variability and reserve pooling, as well as the 
potential increases in insurance coverage associated with these scenarios. 
 Finally, an alternative approach to conceptualize the benefits of lower contagion 
risk and variability due to reserve pooling consists in calculating the hypothetical level of 
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reserves that would be required to attain the same coverage ratios obtained under reserve 
pooling (    ). Hypothetical reserves (HRi) can be calculated as 
HRi =              
Moreover, by subtracting the current average level of reserves (under autarky) from the 
hypothetical reserves (Ri – HRi), we can visualize the reserve savings (or disavings) from 
alternative hypothetical arrangements. As before, these scenarios are constructed based 
on hypothetical reductions of reserve variability (τ) and different degrees of reserve 
pooling (ρ). 
 
3.4 Findings and Results 
3.4.1 Model Results 
Table 3.5 presents the empirical results for six different specifications based on the 
unbalanced quarterly panel for the seven countries under consideration during the Q1-99 
to Q1-09 period. Model 1 is based on the basic specification of the Buffer Stock Model, 
excluding CONTAGION. Model 1A introduces contagion into model 1. Similarly, Model 
1B extends model 1A by including a dummy variable (FLOATINGD) to account for free-
floating exchange arrangements. Models 2, 2A, and 2B repeat the exercise above, but 
with OBLI as an alternative specification to the VULNERABILITY variable. Pedroni tests 
for cointegration revealed that the variables in the models are not cointegrated, and thus 
all of the variables included (with the exception of contagion) are run in first differences 
to correct issues of non-stationarity in the original series (see Appendix D). 
 The results on this table provide empirical support for the hypothesis that 
contagion risk is positively and significantly correlated with the optimal level of reserves. 
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Across the six different model specifications presented, the coefficient for contagion 
remains positive, significant, and of a consistent magnitude. According to these results, 
an increase by one unit in the CONTAGION variable is associated with a 0.02 percentage 
point increase in the quarterly rate of growth of reserves demanded. Thus, an increase in 
contagion risk appears to trigger an acceleration in the accumulation of reserves. In order 
to put this coefficient in context, it is useful to interpret it in terms of standard deviations. 
A change by one standard deviation in the CONTAGION variable (3.33) is associated 
with a 0.067 percentage point increase in the growth rate of reserves. This in turn is 
equivalent to about 48% of one standard deviation in the quarterly rate of growth of 
reserves. Moreover, the inclusion of CONTAGION as a regressor improves the 
explanatory power of the model, as evidenced by the increase in the values of R-square 
from Models 1 and 2 to Models 1A and 2A, respectively. 
 An interesting result from these empirical estimations is the lack of statistical 
significance (and in some cases negative sign) of the value attached to the coefficient of 
the estimator dlnvar, which stands in direct contradiction to the expectations and the 
traditional findings in the literature, including those in Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981). 
However, once one takes into consideration that the first-differenced natural log of the 
variance of detrended reserves from previous periods is used as a proxy for the 
idiosyncratic country risk to correlate today’s level of demand for reserves, this finding is 
not as surprising. In addition to capturing idiosyncratic risk, the growth rate of variation 
in previous levels of detrended reserves might also capture previous periods‘ response in 
the growth rate of reserves to ongoing shocks. Future specifications of this model should 
revisit the appropriateness of the use of variance of de-trended reserves as a proxy for 
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idiosyncratic risk, by either extending the period of the moving window, or by finding 
another measure altogether. 
 As shown in Table 3.5, the remaining coefficients are in accordance with 
expectations in terms of their signs. Moreover, all of them (again with the exception of 
the coefficient of dlnvar) are statistically significant at the 10% level. According to these 
results, all else equal, a one percentage point increase in the growth rate of the 
opportunity cost of reserves, as measure by the EMBI+ spread, is associated with 
approximately a 0.07 percentage point decrease in the quarterly growth level of reserves 
demanded. Similarly, a one percentage point increase in the growth rate of the aggregate 
of imports, net portfolio and foreign direct investment (vulnerability) tends to be matched 
by a 0.055 percentage point rise in the rate of growth of demanded reserves. Moreover, 
the alternative specification dlnOBLI appears to provide higher explanatory power to the 
model than dlnVULNERABILITY. According to the results of Model 2A, a one 
percentage point increase in the growth rate of OBLI is associated with a 0.15 percentage 
point increase in the quarterly growth rate of reserves demanded. Finally, the empirical 
findings presented in Models 1B and 2B fail to provide support for the inclusion of free- 
floating exchange regime dummy variable as part of the reserve demand process. In both 
cases the coefficients of FloatingD, while negative, are not statistically significant, and 
thus do not contribute to the explanatory power of the model
20
. Overall, Models 1A and 
2A (i.e. those including contagion risk), explain 25.4% and 38.4% of the variation in the 
growth rate of reserves. 
                                                 
20 Authors like Bastourre et, al. (2009) have found similar contradictory results. 
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Table 3.5. Least Squares Panel Regression with Time Fixed Effects 
 
  Dependent: Dlnreserves 
      Model 1 1a 1b 2 2a 2b 
C 0.027** 0.033** 0.033** 0.036** 0.039** 0.054** 
 
(.006) (.006) (.009) (.007) (.007) (.011) 
Dlnvar -0.024 -0.020 -0.020 0.000 0.002 0.005 
 
(.015) (.015) (.015) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
Dlnembi -0.072**  -0.068** -0.068** -0.073** -0.072** -0.068** 
 
(.033) (.033) (.033) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Dlnvulnerability 0.058** 0.055** 0.055** 
   
 
(.016) (.015) (.015) 
   Dlnnobli 
   
0.164** 0.156** 0.156** 
    
(.046) (.046) (.046) 
Contagion 
 
0.022** 0.022** 
 
0.016* 0.019* 
  
(.007) (.007)  (.009) (.01) 
FloatingD 
  
-0.001 
  
-0.018 
   
(.012) 
  
(.014) 
R-square 0.220 0.254 0.254 0.364 0.384 0.378 
# of X-sections 7 7 7 6 6 6 
Period 99Q2-08Q4 99Q2-08Q5 99Q2-08Q6 02Q2-09Q1 02Q2-09Q2 02Q2-08Q4 
N 266 266 266 137 137 134 
** Statistically Significant at the 5% level. 
    * Statistically Significant at the 10% level. 
    Standard Errors reported in parentheses 
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3.4.2 Effects of Contagion 
The main finding from the previous section is significant in itself. However, it is 
important to conceptualize the effects of contagion on reserve demands in order to assess 
the economic meaning of this effect, especially as it relates to the real cost of holding 
these additional reserves. A simple way of making this assessment is by forecasting the 
annual change in the level of reserves due to hypothetical changes in contagion risks. In 
other words, if one assumes that the prevailing average growth rate of reserves (from the 
observable sample) would continue in the future, we would expect the level of reserves to 
grow accordingly. However, if on the contrary, one assumes a change in the level of 
contagion risk in the last period by one unit, it will be associated with a 0.02 percent 
increase in the growth rate of reserves—and thus the level of reserves that would be 
accumulated. The gap between these two growth paths accounts for the cost of contagion 
(see Appendix E). The hypothetical annual cost of changes in contagion risk in relation to 
GDP can thus be expressed as: 
                          
                                 
 
   
       
 
   
 
Where      corresponds to country i‘s level of reserves at the last observed period,     is 
the average quarterly growth rate of reserves for country i,       is the hypothetical 
change in level of contagion risk faced by country i at the first forecast period. 
 Figure 3.3 captures this cost under different scenarios involving hypothetical 
changes in contagion risk. As shown in this figure, the costs of accumulating additional 
reserves as a result of changes in contagion risk are not negligible. For instance, in the 
case of Peru an increase in the level of contagion by two units would be associated with a 
change in reserves due to contagion equivalent to about 0.1% of this country‘s annual 
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GDP. While this figure might not seem like a significant amount, it is important to put it 
in perspective in relation to the country‘s spending on social priorities. For instance, in 
2008 Peru spent only about 1% of its GDP on primary education. Therefore, even a tenth 
of 1% of GDP could arguably be redirected toward more productive ends. As argued in 
the following section, mechanisms like regional reserve pooling—aimed at reducing 
contagion risk—would free up significant resources, which could in turn be redirected to 
alternative development purposes. 
Figure 3.3 Change in Reserves due to Hypothetical Changes in Contagion 
as % of Annual GDP 
 
 
3.4.2 Benefits of Pooling Scenarios 
Table 3.6 presents the coverage ratio under different degrees of reserve pooling for the 
countries under consideration during the sample period. In line with the findings in 
Eichengreen (2007), this chapter finds that under this traditional method of calculating  
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Table 3.6. Coverage Ratios under Reserve Pooling (1999-2009) 
  ρ= 0 ρ = 0.1 ρ = 0.2 ρ = 0.3 ρ = 0.4 ρ = 0.5 ρ = 0.6 ρ = 0.7 ρ = 0.8 ρ = 0.9 ρ = 1 
Argentina 2.18 2.20 2.18 2.16 2.14 2.13 2.13 2.12 2.11 2.11 2.10 
Brazil 1.31 1.44 1.56 1.66 1.75 1.83 1.90 1.96 2.01 2.06 2.10 
Chile 6.75 2.97 2.53 2.36 2.27 2.22 2.18 2.15 2.13 2.12 2.10 
Colombia 2.69 2.29 2.20 2.17 2.15 2.13 2.12 2.12 2.11 2.11 2.10 
Mexico 2.92 2.69 2.53 2.41 2.33 2.27 2.22 2.18 2.15 2.13 2.10 
Peru 1.79 1.98 2.04 2.06 2.08 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 
Venezuela 2.45 2.38 2.28 2.22 2.18 2.16 2.14 2.13 2.12 2.11 2.10 
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coverage ratios some low variability countries would see their coverage reduced as a 
result of pooling with high variability countries. Based on this result, countries like Chile 
and Mexico would be most negatively affected by reserve pooling, and would thus have 
little incentive to join such arrangements. 
 However as previously argued in this chapter and by others in the literature, 
reserve pooling, through the expansion of crisis response resources and coordination, is 
likely to reduce contagion risk (as expressed in lower balance of payments variability of 
member countries). Moreover, given the empirical finding presented in table 3.5, these 
potential decreases in the level of contagion risk would have tangible consequences for 
the opportunity cost of precautionary reserve accumulation. In that vein, Figures 3.4a-4g 
(remaining figures shown in Appendix F) illustrate the potential gains in coverage ratios 
once one accounts for reductions in variability. From these tables it can be seen that once 
contagion risk (and thus variability) reductions are considered, the prospects for reserve 
pooling in Latin America change significantly. Given a sufficiently high reduction in 
variability, there could be significant incentives for all countries in the region to join a 
regional reserve pool. However, we can also see from these figures that relatively low-
variability countries like Chile, Mexico and Colombia would require significant 
reductions in variability for such an arrangement to make sense for them—approximately 
68%, 27% and 22%, respectively.  On the other hand, a country like Argentina (see figure 
3.4a below), which under the traditional method would not benefit from pooling, would 
see its coverage ratio improve considerably even from a marginal reduction in variability 
(as low as 1%). 
  
77 
 
Figure 3.4a. Coverage Ratios under Reserve Pooling: Argentina 
 
 Appendix G  presents the reserve savings/disavings that result from hypothetical 
reductions in contagion and different levels of reserve pooling. As shown by the area in 
blue, even moderate reductions in variability would lead to significant savings in terms of 
the potential level of reserves that would have to be held to maintain the higher level of 
coverage under reserve pooling. Here again, it is the relatively high-variability countries 
that would benefit the most. For instance, assuming a scenario under which countries 
contribute half of their reserves to the pool (ρ=0.5) and incremental reductions in 
volatility of τ=0.5 (thus a total reduction in volatility of 25%), Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela would each save approximately $7.7, $64.8, 
$7.8, $22.5, $7.9 and $3 Billions US Dollars in that order. On the other hand, Chile 
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would face disavings of $9.2 Billion US Dollars in Reserves, given the resulting lower 
coverage ratio. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The last two decades have been characterized by two key trends in international finance, 
particularly as it relates to developing countries. First, these countries have accumulated 
unprecedented levels of international reserves for countercyclical purposes. Second, 
institutions of regional cooperation, such as regional reserves pools, have emerged and 
strengthened. In the Latin American context, both of these trends have been visibly 
present. Unlike China and countries in South East Asia, Latin American reserves appear 
to reflect the traditional precautionary motive for accumulation. That is, these nations 
continue to demand high levels of reserves to match the increasing openness of their 
current and financial accounts, as well as the increased volatility that comes with it. 
While relatively high levels of foreign reserves allow for deterrence and more 
manageable adjustments in the face of crisis episodes, they come at a significant 
opportunity cost. 
 Traditional optimal reserve models, such as the buffer stock model, have 
incorporated this cost, as well as the potential readjustment cost to develop a cost-
minimization framework that captures the optimal level of ―insurance‖ that countries 
should purchase. Nevertheless, the continued trend towards globalization, and 
particularly capital account liberalization, on the part of emerging economies necessitates 
a reconsideration of the traditional models by incorporating risks exogenous to the 
country in question. This chapter fills a gap in the literature by illustrating that contagion 
risk, in particular, is an integral part of this insurance acquisition decision by Latin 
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American countries. The empirical findings presented here suggest that in an increasingly 
open-economy world with imperfect information, these countries are in fact concerned 
with the conditions both within their borders, but also with those of surrounding 
nations—which might have significant effects on their own crisis prospects due to 
contagion. Based on a proxy for contagion risk, this chapter finds that an increase by one 
unit in the CONTAGION variable (i.e. one additional standard deviation in the aggregate 
EMP index for neighboring countries) is associated with approximately a 0.02 percentage 
point increase in the quarterly growth rate of reserves demanded. Moreover, by taking 
this result a step further, it shows that the estimated cost of holding reserves due to 
contagion risk is not negligible, especially when taking into consideration the otherwise 
capital-deprived nations that hold them. With this background, it seems clear that any 
mechanism that could reduce contagion risk in the region would also free up significant 
resources that could be redirected to more productive ends.  
 Many in the literature have provided normative arguments in favor of regional 
cooperation mechanisms in the region. By empirically showing that Latin American 
countries insure against contagion risk, this chapter provides an additional impetus for the 
creation of such mechanisms. Regional reserve pools, as complements to the traditional 
international financial institutions, are uniquely positioned to prevent and respond to 
regional financial crises in a timely manner, and thus reduce the threat of contagion. By 
building on this assumption, this chapter showed that unlike previous analysis which 
ignore the potential reduction in contagion risk from pooling, a regional reserve pool in 
Latin America might prove beneficial to most (if not all) countries in the region even 
under relatively small reductions in balance of payments variability.   
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 The implication of these findings is critical for the promotion of countercyclical 
regional arrangements aimed at lowering the cost, while providing comparable levels of 
insurance. If Latin American countries, in fact, insure not only against their own risk, but 
the risk originating from deteriorating conditions in the neighborhood, co-insurance 
mechanisms like regional reserve pool funds (e.g. the Latin American Reserve Fund) and 
swap arrangements might prove useful in taking advantage of the cost-savings afforded 
by these schemes. In other words, these findings imply that countries have a stake at 
ensuring that a crisis does not occur in a neighboring country, which consequently would 
decrease their own exposure to contagion risk, and thus their need for reserve holdings. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REGIONAL POOLING OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES:  
THE LATIN AMERICAN RESERVE FUND IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A staple of Latin American regional integration since 1978, the Latin American Reserve 
Fund (FLAR) continues to serve its functions as a lender of last resort to member 
countries facing balance of payments difficulties. Despite its nature and its co-existence 
in an unprecedented environment of country-level reserve accumulation, the literature 
provides relatively little analysis of this institution and of its functional performance in 
comparison to the existing literature on other multilateral institutions. This chapter is 
directed at highlighting the role that FLAR plays in the regional financial structure, while 
critically identifying both the strengths and potential challenges to its success. 
 The first section provides a background of the institution and its functions. The 
following section captures some of what the literature has to say about this institution and 
its role both within the regional and global financial structure. Next, this chapter provides 
a critical analysis of the effectiveness of the FLAR by assessing three case studies of 
loans approved to FLAR members. By synthesizing available qualitative data from 
reports and documentation with quantitative measures of economic performance, these 
case studies provide a first empirical assessment of the context under which FLAR has 
approved loans and subsequent economic trends. It aims to answer a simple, yet partially 
neglected question: Have FLAR interventions worked? Lastly, the analysis revisits the 
normative prescriptions for FLAR that have commonly been found in the literature, 
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comparing these to data from in-person interviews and the lessons learned from the case 
studies. 
 
4.2 Background 
The Latin American Reserve Fund is one of the remaining regional institutions of the 
Import Substitution era.  A direct descendant of the 1969 Cartagena Accord, FLAR was 
first formally established as the Andean Reserve Fund (ARF) in 1978, thus serving as the 
reserve branch of the Andean Community of Nations. Original members of the ARF 
included Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Through the Lima 
Agreement of June 1988, and in attempt to further regional integration in the continent, 
ARF officially changed its name to the Latin American Reserve Fund, and evolved into a 
more inclusive regional model, hence allowing membership to non-Andean nations. 
Costa Rica was the first non-Andean nation to join on March 30, 1999, and would more 
recently be followed by Uruguay, which joined the institution on May 30, 2008. The 
Fund‘s financial resources derive primarily from its members‘ contributions, which as of 
June 2011 totaled US$2,343.8 million in subscribed capital, of which US$1,892.9 million 
has already been paid into the fund. The three largest member countries (Colombia, Peru, 
and Venezuela) account for 20% shares of this capital, while the smaller countries 
account for 10% each. FLAR has three main goals, which have been approached in the 
following order: 
 Assisting member countries during balance of payments crises or in the 
restructuring of their debt through the provision of loans and/or the guaranteeing 
of third party loans. 
 Contributing to the better management of the reserves held by member countries, 
either through the attainment of better yields in the constitutive funds of the 
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institution or through the direct management of funds assigned by the member 
countries, but which do not form part of the paid capital of the institution. 
 Promoting regional coordination through the harmonization of exchange rate, 
monetary and financial policies of member countries. 
Historically it has been the first objective that has taken precedence over the others. 
However, as will be argued later, this is likely to change as the number of loans requested 
and approved by the Fund continues to decline in recent years. 
 Based on the goals outlined above, FLAR offers several key services to its 
member countries‘ central banks, to some of their public institutions, and more recently 
to other public institutions in non-member countries in the region. FLAR offers five main 
types of loans with different structures aimed at addressing different potential problems 
that might affect its member countries: balance of payments support, foreign debt 
restructuring, liquidity, contingency, and treasury credit lines. The following table 
summarizes the total number of each type approved per country over the FLAR‘s history. 
Table 4.1. Number of Loans Approved by Type. 
 BoP Support Debt Restructure Liquidity Contingent 
Bolivia 2 - 9 - 
Colombia 1 - 4 1 
Costa Rica - 1 - - 
Ecuador 5 1 10 - 
Peru 2 - 4 - 
Uruguay - - - - 
Venezuela 1 - 1 - 
Note: Calculated based on official FLAR data. 
 
 Balance of Payments (BoP) credits are potentially the largest type of loans 
available to a member country under a FLAR agreement. They are extended with a 3-
year term for repayment with a 1-year grace period for capital amortization. At present, 
BoP loans are granted at an interest rate equal to the 3-month Libor rate plus 400 basis 
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points, and a prepayment fee of 30 basis points. As its name suggests, BoP credits are 
extended to the central banks of member countries member countries facing problems 
arising from either its current or financial accounts. In order to qualify for this type of 
loan, the requesting central bank must provide a written report detailing its shortage of 
reserves, as well as outlining its current and future plans to reverse its balance of 
payments deficit. Moreover, as part of the loan contract, the soliciting country agrees not 
to impose measures that may affect the imports from other member countries as part of 
its balance of payments restructuring process. The terms of the loan (e.g. length, cost, and 
limits) are ultimately at the discretion of the Board of Directors and the Assembly (See 
Appendix I). However, in practice FLAR follows the statutes outlined in Article 9 of its 
constitutive chapter, which states that BoP loans can be approved for the smallest of:  
 Up to 2.5 times the paid-in capital of the member country, with the exception 
of Bolivia and Ecuador, which have preferential access of 2.6 times their 
contribution (USD 314 million for Uruguay; USD 395.25 million for Costa 
Rica; USD 484.64 million in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador; USD 931.75 
million for Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, as of July 2009). 
 The global deficit of the country‘s balance of payments account in the 
preceding twelve months. 
 The percentage set by Board of Directors of the total of imports by the 
soliciting country‘s imports originating from other member countries. 
 
 Foreign debt restructuring support (FDRS) loans, granted directly to the 
countries‘ central banks, represent the other potential source of medium-term financing 
for member countries under FLAR. As its name suggests, and as will be illustrated in the 
case studies section of this chapter, these loans have the potential to significantly improve 
the performance of the central bank‘s liabilities by allowing for the repurchasing of a 
high yield outstanding sovereign instruments. Like the BoP lines of credit, these loans are 
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approved for a period of 3-years with a 1-year grace period, at a rate equivalent to the 3-
month Libor rate plus 400 basis points, and with a 30 basis points prepayment fee. They 
are also subject to approval of the fund‘s Board of Directors. However, FDRS loans 
provide a smaller potential credit limit than BoP Loans. FDRS credit lines are capped at 
1.5 times a country‘s paid-in capital, with the exception of Ecuador and Bolivia which 
can access up to 1.6 times their paid-in capital. 
 The remaining three loans are aimed at providing short-term financing. Liquidity 
loans have a one-year term limit, and directed towards helping countries resolve 
temporary shocks to their liquidity standing. Credits equivalent to a country‘s paid-in 
capital are available at a rate that equals the 3-month Libor rate plus 150 basis points, 
with a pre-payment fee of 10 basis points. Contingent lines of credit are offered by FLAR 
for 6-month, renewable, periods.  This type of credit line, the most widely used in the 
history of FLAR, provides precautionary access to funds to better address unforeseen 
internal or external shocks. Contingent financing, when used, accrue interest equivalent 
to the 3-month Libor rate plus 150 basis points, with a repayment fee of 10 basis points, 
and a commitment fee of 90 basis points. Contingent lines are available for up to times a 
country‘s paid-in capital21. Treasury loans are of up to twice the amount paid into the 
fund and are available for terms not to exceed 30 days. Unlike the longer-term loans, 
which must be approved by the Board of Directors, liquidity, contingent, and treasury 
credit lines can be promptly approved by FLAR‘s Executive President. 
 Given the heterogeneity in size and economic conditions of the FLAR, it is 
important to consider what the resources available represent in terms of protection against 
                                                 
21 Bolivia and Ecuador can access up to 2.1 times their paid-in capital to the fund, in the form of 
liquidity loans or contingent lines of credit. 
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shocks, given each country‘s specific characteristics. For instance, Table 4.2 considers 
the case of BoP loans, which provide access to the largest potential amounts. Using the 
first lending parameter (typically the applicable binding constraint) one can put in 
perspective the relative importance of these loans in relation to the potential needs of the 
member countries: 
Table 4.2. Largest Potential Loans Relative to Key Indicators (As of 2009) 
 
Reserves Short-term Debt Imports 
Bolivia 6.4% 87.5% 8.5% 
Colombia 3.8% 22.7% 2.2% 
Costa Rica 9.7% 16.9% 3.2% 
Ecuador 16.9% 34.1% 1.8% 
Peru 2.9% 19.7% 3.6% 
Uruguay 3.9% 27.9% 3.9% 
Venezuela 4.3% 5.8% 1.4% 
Source: Calculated based on World Bank National Accounts Data 
 
    
 As can be observed from this table, the significance of the available funds under 
the FLAR varies considerably from country to country. For smaller countries like 
Ecuador, Costa Rica and Bolivia, the loan limits represent a significant portion of their 
potential needs. On the contrary, the large member countries (e.g. Peru, Venezuela and 
Colombia) cannot rely on FLAR funds to cover a large portion of their financing needs in 
the case of a crisis. This difference in the relative significance of the FLAR funds for 
large and small countries underlies the decrease in the number of loans requested and 
approved by the fund in recent years. Since 1992, only two loans have been requested 
and approved for a large country (one of them never disbursed)—both to Colombia in 
1999. By contrast, during the same period 8 loans were approved to small countries, 
particularly to Ecuador (5 loans). These figures pale in comparison with those of the 
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previous fourteen years (1978-1991), when the total number of loans requested and 
approved was 30 and the small/large country participation was balanced. The sudden 
decline (in the number of loans) that has prevailed in the second half of the time of 
existence of the FLAR highlights a worrisome trend for the viability and relevance of the 
fund. 
 
4.3 Literature Review 
4.3.1 Regional Integration 
The case of FLAR must first be considered in the context of the overall push for the 
creation of regional arrangements of cooperation throughout the developing world. In the 
aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, the ability of international financial institutions 
and the overall global financial structure to address the hazards of globalization for 
developing nations have increasingly been called into question. Thus an alternative has 
been the promotion of alternative arrangements of coordination and balance of payments 
support at the regional level. These mechanisms range from simple bilateral swap 
arrangements of hard currency (e.g. the Chiang Mai Initiative) to more formal pooling of 
foreign reserves.  
 There is strong backing in the literature for the creation of mechanisms of 
regional coordination and support
22
.  Arguments in favor of these mechanisms include 
not only political and cultural ties, but also the benefits of risk-sharing and 
macroeconomic coordination. Indeed, these institutions have even become an important 
component of the International Monetary Fund‗s recent attempt to reshape itself to better deal 
                                                 
22 The extent and functions of such institutions are still a matter of debate. 
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with the ―Global Imbalances‖ problem and with the much needed democratization of the 
Fund (Strauss-Kahn 2010).   
 Ocampo (2006), among others, have summarized the rationalization for the 
creation of these mechanisms.   For example, Ocampo argues that the rise of ―open 
regionalism‖ that has accompanied globalization has intensified the degree to which 
externalities from the macroeconomic policies of one country can affect its neighbors in 
the area. Thus policies that only address the problems of an individual country are likely 
to result in outcomes that aggravate contagion (e.g. reduced regional trade and 
competitive devaluations). Moreover, he argues that as globalization continues to 
undermine individual countries‘ economic decision-making, it is at the regional level that 
countries are able to retain some of their ―policy autonomy.‖ Furthermore, International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the IMF might face diseconomies of scale in the 
provision of financial services (e.g. crisis prevention and resolution), while regional and 
sub-regional financial institutions would be better equipped to deal with localized 
problems. Finally, Ocampo suggests that small and medium-size countries, whose 
influence with IFIs is limited, can benefit from increased competition in the provision of 
financial services. In contrast to the negligible role of small nations under the current 
financial structure, regional institutions enjoy an increased level of ―ownership‖ by its 
small member countries. 
 In Latin America in particular, Agosin (2000) argues that by protecting a country 
from a crisis occurrence, regional monetary institutions produce valuable positive 
externalities to other countries in the region. Mistry (1999) proposes regional institutions 
as ―mezzanine bulwarks‖ of crisis response between national and global response 
mechanisms, which can reduce the ―neigbourhood costs‖ of crisis mismanagements by 
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international financial institutions. He argues that regional crisis containment 
mechanisms are well suited to stem the spread of contagion through coordinated 
prevention (e.g. supervision and macroeconomic policy synchronicity) and response. 
Mistry purports that this then creates a credible front of defense against speculation, 
limits the extent of trade and financial markets disruptions and avoids competitive 
devaluations among neighboring countries. 
 Some in the literature, while supportive of regional cooperation in general, have 
expressed valid reservations about the feasibility of reserve pooling mechanisms in Latin 
America. For example, Machinea and Rozenwurcel (2006) argue that regional 
cooperation in the region faces significant obstacles. For example, there is a relative (to 
the European Union) lack of existing interdependence as evidenced by the low levels of 
intraregional trade and financial links.  Moreover, there is a tendency among Latin 
American countries to try to differentiate themselves from their neighbors following a 
crisis—in an attempt to avoid being bunched together by unknowledgeable investors. 
 
4.3.2 The Role of FLAR 
Literature discussions of the role of FLAR in relation to existing international 
mechanisms of balance of payments of support like the IMF have largely agreed that the 
former is better suited to play a complementary role, and not a substitute for the latter. 
Eichengreen (2006) argues that FLAR should serve as a complement to the IMF because 
by doing so, it would ensure the additionality of resources available for crisis support. 
Moreover, he claims that surveillance and conditionality are best exercised by outside 
institutions in order to avoid the time-consistency problem. Similarly, Agosin (2000) and 
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Agosin and Heresi (2010) see a complementary role for FLAR, under which it would 
serve the same roles traditionally assigned to the IMF, but at a regional level. In their 
view, FLAR could serve as an intermediary of IMF funds, especially in the event of 
simultaneous crises associated with extraordinary demands for financing. Along the same 
lines, Ocampo (2006) proposes a ―division of labor‖ among mechanisms of support, 
under which the IMF would provide support during large-scale crisis affecting large 
countries, while regional mechanisms like FLAR provide complementary support to 
small and medium-size countries. On the other hand, Guarnieri (2008), while still 
considering a role for the IMF, argues that a Latin American and Caribbean Monetary 
Fund (largely based on the FLAR model) could provide countries with ―bridge‖ loans 
during large balance of payments crises, and thus allow the leveraging of larger loans 
from the IMF at better terms when these are needed. 
 McKay et al. (2010) develop a set of ―optimal financing criteria‖ to assess the 
suitability of regional institutions of crisis response to contribute to global financial 
stability. They argue that these mechanisms should be evaluated based on the size of the 
financing pool, timely access to relevant information, analytical expertise, speed of 
decision-making, impartiality in lending decisions, and monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. When comparing their assigned ratings for FLAR to those of the IMF, 
FLAR is seen outperforming the IMF in terms of access to relevant information and 
speed of decision-making, while slightly lagging with regards to the other criteria. In 
addition to these last two attributes; Titelman (2006) and Agosin (2000) argue that FLAR 
is relatively better positioned than the existing international financial institutions due to 
the sense of ownership afforded to member countries. As pointed in these papers, FLAR 
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benefits from preferred-creditor status, which has implied that member countries have 
never defaulted on their obligations to the institution, even in cases when they have 
defaulted on loans to other multinational organizations and private lenders. Moreover, in 
support of the effectiveness of FLAR, Ocampo and Titelman (2010) point out that despite 
its relatively small size, FLAR has provided balance of payment loans to its member 
countries during times of crisis of equivalent or larger size than those provided by the 
IMF. Consequently, Agosin and Heresi (2010) propose FLAR as a starting framework for 
the strengthening of regional financial integration—A view shared by this author. 
 Among the few empirical studies of the effectiveness of FLAR, Rincón (2007) 
using a 43-country panel (including six of the FLAR countries) for the 1984-2003 period 
looks at the relationship between belonging to FLAR and key macroeconomic outcomes. 
It finds that while FLAR membership is not significantly associated with economic 
growth or macroeconomic volatility, countries that belonged to this institution faced 
significantly less volatility in consumption. Eichengreen (2006) calculates simple 
coverage ratios
23
 for the member countries of FLAR, and finds that while some countries 
would benefit from pooling of their reserves, others like Ecuador and Venezuela would 
experience a significant decline in the level of reserve coverage. Based partly on these 
findings, Eichengreen concludes that rather than using its resources for emergency 
lending to deal with sudden stops, FLAR should use a part of these resources and 
borrowed funds to acquire contingent public and private debt securities with the aim of 
deepening the domestic financial sector. 
                                                 
23 Coverage ratios are calculated as the ratio of total reserves available under the pooling 
arrangement and the variability of these reserves.  
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 While there is extensive normative evidence that highlights the strengths of FLAR 
as an institution of crisis support, the analysis of the effectiveness of the institution could 
benefit from a deeper look at the actual outcomes of its interventions. For the most part, 
the works discussed above concentrate on the broader institutional benefits, sometimes at 
the expense of the country/loan-specific level of analysis. For instance, Titelman (2006) 
claims that ―…for the beneficiary countries, these [FLAR‘s] funds have helped 
significantly to relieve liquidity restrictions.‖ However, a further analysis of specific 
interventions provides stronger evidence for this claim. This chapter addresses this point 
by taking a more narrative approach, using both qualitative and quantitative data, to 
assess the context under which loans were given and how effective they were.  By doing 
so, it will provide a more objective look at the role that the FLAR plays in the regional 
financial structure, while highlighting the strengths and potential challenges to its 
success. 
 
4.4 FLAR’s Performance Revisited: Three Case Studies 
The following analysis seeks to explore the effectiveness of FLAR‘s interventions by 
considering three case studies of loans to member countries.  When assessing its 
effectiveness, we must keep in mind that FLAR has intervened (more so) during periods 
of crisis. So the basic question is, to what extent did the FLAR loan alter the economic 
performance of the country?  More broadly, though, the analysis seeks to explore what 
the FLAR experience can show us about cooperation in Latin America: The good, the 
bad, and the (im)possible. 
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 The three key case studies selected have occurred during the period since the East 
Asian Financial crisis—a period of rapid growth in reserve accumulation in the region. 
Moreover, the cases considered capture the span of the types of loans offered by FLAR, 
as well as the size of the requesting country. In this way, these cases attempt to gather 
wide-ranging lessons that illustrate the performance of FLAR in recent years. The 1999 
Colombian case captures the role that contingent lines of credit can play in averting 
further deterioration of a large country‘s financial conditions. It also highlights the ability 
of the institution—along with other regional partners—to help mobilize larger resources. 
The 2003 Costa Rica loan provides a look into the highly effective support that FLAR 
can provide to small member countries through activities such as the provision of foreign 
debt restructuring support. The positive results of the loan provide further impetus for the 
possibility of geographic expansion of the fund to non-Andean countries like Costa Rica, 
which joined only a few years earlier in 1999. By considering the 2006 Ecuador loan, one 
can get a glimpse of FLAR‘s ability to provide effective and sustainable support to 
frequent borrowers.  
 For each one of the case studies, loan documents, institutional reports and 
contemporary literature are matched with ex-ante and ex-post data on reserves, GDP, 
sovereign bond spreads, among other key indicators.  The empirical evidence is analyzed 
to determine whether the FLAR‘s interventions improved certain key indicators 
associated with a lower probability of a balance of payments and/or currency crisis. Did 
the economy stabilize and recover after the FLAR‘s intervention? In order to do this, I 
rely on empirical data from 8 quarters before and after the loan was approved. 
Additionally, I consult the loan application letters (and other related documents) 
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submitted by the central banks to the FLAR, detailing the reasons for the application and 
what steps they expect to take to resolve the crisis. 
 
4.4.1 Colombia 1999 
Requested on August 11
th
, 1999, this set of loans for $500 million US Dollars ($125 
million in the form of a liquidity loan, and $375 million as a contingency loan) were 
promptly approved two weeks later on August 26
th
. Moreover, the larger contingency 
loan—having been approved but not disbursed—is likely to shed some light into how 
countries might use the fund as a source of contingent funding, and/or how the fund 
might be able to better position itself by providing new mechanisms of contingency 
funding (e.g. swap arrangements, etc.) These loans, along with two others granted to 
Ecuador the same year, were the only applications for help around the time of the Asian 
Financial Crisis. These Colombia loans are also intriguing in that they represented the last 
official application for help from a large member country.  
 FLAR‘s loans were part of a larger ―rescue package‖, which totaled US$6.9 
billion. In addition to FLAR‘s contribution, this package consisted of US$2.7 billion 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), US$1.7 billion from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), US$1.4 billion from the World Bank, and US$600 million 
from the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) (―Colombia to Receive‖ 1999). It is 
important to note that while FLAR loans were approved within two weeks, the Extended 
Fund Facility contingency loan by the IMF was finally approved months later on 
December 20
th
, 1999. Unlike the funds secured from the IMF, a portion of the liquidity 
FLAR loan, along with those from the IDB, the World Bank and the CAF, were directed 
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towards strengthening the social safety net through contributions to the Social Emergency 
Fund (―President Explains‖ 1999). 
 The Colombian economy experienced its worst performance in recent history 
during the first half of 1999, when GDP shrank at an unprecedented 6.9%. During this 
time the country‘s stock of international reserves plummeted to US$8,215 million from 
US$8,741 million the previous year, as the traditional current account surplus turned into 
a deficit and capital flight intensified. All while unemployment reached 20.9%, and 
government revenues dropped significantly, leading to growing budget deficits and rising 
sovereign foreign debt. The signs of a brewing crisis were evident. 
 The origins of this impending crisis are debatable. For instance, the IMF 
concludes that the crisis was ―…the result of unsustainable fiscal policies, external 
shocks, and a difficult internal security situation.‖ (IMF 1999). Growing government 
expenditures and the 1991 constitutional mandate that required the central government to 
share revenues with state-level governments were seen as the main perpetrators. An 
alternative explanation of the change of fortunes in Colombia is based on the country‘s 
adoption of neoliberal policy. The 1990s liberalization process in Latin America was 
mainly characterized by drastic tariff reductions, public enterprises privatization, 
increasing capital account openness, and more recently inflation-targeting. Lower tariffs 
opened the way for a surge in imports, which contributed to the transformation of current 
account surpluses into deficits. Accelerated elimination of tariffs exposed small domestic 
producers to foreign competition and led to the elimination of jobs, and a deterioration in 
the government budget deficit as revenues fell.  Moreover, capital account liberalization 
exposed the country to many of the external shocks outlined under the IMF argument. 
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 Given this scenario, it is difficult to isolate the effect of FLAR‘s intervention both 
through its liquidity and contingency loans. In the particular case of the 1999 Colombia 
loans, this task is further complicated by the fact that other loans were simultaneously 
approved by other multinational organizations, including the one by the IMF which had a 
significant conditionality component associated with it. Figure 4.1 presents the 
performance of four key indicators before and after the approval of this set of loans. The 
cyclical and trend components of each indicator are obtained using a Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter (see Hodrick and Prescott (1997)). These findings are supplemented by simple 
mean equality t-tests presented in Table 4.3. Based on the HP decompositions, it appears 
that the period following the approval of FLAR‘s loans was characterized by a marked 
switch in the direction of the trend of international reserves.  After a prolonged period of 
decline, reserves grew in the two years after the FLAR loans were approved. Despite the 
improvement in the trend component of reserves, reserves remained (statistically) 
significantly lower in the 2-year post-loan period than in the pre-loan period, averaging 
US$9,118 million and US$8,637 million respectively. 
 Colombia‘s gross domestic product also experienced a pronounced change in its 
trend component as the country returned to periods of growth following the approval of 
these loans. Similar to the case of reserves, average annual GDP growth rate during the 
post-loan period was lower than that during the pre-loan period considered (-0.135% 
versus 1.954%); albeit not significantly different from each other in statistical terms.  
Average portfolio investment flows were higher in the two years following the approval 
of FLAR loans increasing from US$257 million in the pre-loan period to US$541 
million. However, our t-test reveals that these two means are not significantly different 
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from each other. Finally, one area where there appears to be significant improvement is in 
the credit markets. The money market interest rate continued its downward trend, and 
was significantly lower in the post-loan period. Money market interest rates in Colombia 
averaged 28.7% in the pre-loan period and 11.5% in the post-loan period. 
 A few lessons can be drawn from the particular experience of this loan. First, and 
perhaps more importantly, this case study highlights the ability of FLAR to work in 
coordination with other regional institutions to mobilize much larger extra-regional  
resources, as was the case with the US$2.7 billion loan from the IMF. In that sense, by 
being a first-mover in providing support to Colombia, it arguably also lent credibility to 
the country‘s reform plan. Nevertheless, the fact that the FLAR‘s share of Colombia‘s 
rescue package was relatively very small—and thus needed to be complemented by larger 
funds from other sources—also underscores some of the limitations that currently ail the 
institution in terms of being a viable lender of last resort to the larger member countries 
with respectively larger needs. This is further evidenced by the fact that during the last 
financial crisis Colombia bypassed FLAR altogether and secured directly a contingent 
line of credit with the IMF, under this last institution‘s recently created Flexible Credit 
Line arrangement for US$10.5 billion.  
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Figure 4.1. Colombia’s August 1999 Loan 
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Table 4.3. Means Tests of Equality: Colombia 1999 
 
  Pre-Loan Mean Post-Loan Mean T-stat
1
 
International Reserves (Mills USDs) 9,118.223 8,637.351 2.663* 
Money Market Interest Rate (%) 28.777 11.488 10.152** 
GDP Annual Growth Rate (%) -0.135 1.954 1.129 
Portfolio Investment Inflows (Mills USDs) 256.676 541.279 -1.347 
1. Ho: Pre-Loan and Post-Loan Means are equal. 
   * Statistically significant at the α=0.05 level.  
** Statistically significant at the α=0.01 level. 
   
     
4.4.2 Costa Rica 2003 
Costa Rica requested a foreign debt restructuring support loan from FLAR on March 4, 
2003, which was promptly approved on April 7, 2003 at an interest rate equivalent to the 
3-month Libor rate plus 200 basis points (FLAR 2003). While this loan was approved for 
a four-year term with a one-year grace period, it was repaid in advance in April of 2006. 
This loan—Costa Rica‘s only—is interesting in that it is one of only two loans granted in 
FLAR‘s history for the purpose of foreign debt restructuring. How Costa Rica used the 
US$156 million to restructure its debt and the effects of this restructuring highlight the 
role that the FLAR plays/could play in promoting preventive measures aimed at reducing 
the odds of a crisis and at improving the yield of its members‘ financial resources. 
 At the time of the loan request Costa Rica was experiencing a slight economic 
recovery after three years of languid economic growth.  GDP growth rates increased in 
large part due to growing external demand, which increased exports and led to a smaller 
deficit in the current account relative to previous years. Financial account surpluses also 
contributed to the offsetting of the current account deficit and led to a growing stock of 
international reserves relative to the previous year. Despite these positive developments, 
the literature reveals the existing concern by international institutions at the time about 
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the country‘s perceived internal and external vulnerabilities originating from persistent 
fiscal imbalances, and the rising interest rates resulting from the government financing of 
these imbalances (ECLAC (2004), Deutsch Bank (2004), IMF (2003)). Moreover 
continuous depreciation of the domestic currency, along with the perceived riskiness 
associated with government debt led to a growing dollarization of the domestic economy 
and thus reduced control of monetary policy by the central bank. 
 FLAR‘s loan was requested as part of the Costa Rican government‘s attempt to 
improve the performance of the liabilities side of its balance sheet. More specifically, the 
Central Bank used the $156 million loan granted by FLAR to redeem in advance its 
outstanding Series A Brady bonds with maturity date of 2010 in the third quarter of 2003 
(Deutsch Bank (2004)). The savings associated with this debt restructuring operation are 
evident when one considers that the redeemed Brady bonds required interest payments of 
6.25%, while the applicable interest rate for the FLAR loan was the Libor rate plus 200 
basis points, or approximately 3.11% as of July 2003. This debt restructuring was 
followed by the Central Bank‘s repurchasing of its Series B Brady bonds in January 
2004, financed by the issuing of certificates of deposit. (ECLAC (2004)). It is clear that 
FLAR‘s loan facilitated the beginning of a long-term process of debt restructuring aimed 
at lowering the financing cost of its external debt, as well as the eventual reduction in 
risks associated with original sin. For instance, in his outgoing report of 2010, Francisco 
de Paula Gutiérrez—Costa Rica‘s Central Bank president for the 2002-2010 period—
concludes that foreign-currency-denominated liabilities went from accounting for half of 
all of the Central Bank‘s liabilities to 28% by December 2009. 
101 
 
 An analysis of the empirical data available partially supports the stabilization 
process that the Costa Rican economy was experiencing during the period following the 
approval of FLAR‘s loan. As seen on Figure 4.2, Costa Rica‘s stock of foreign reserves 
was on a positive (albeit very modest) trend in the two-year-period preceding April 2003. 
This positive trend was intensified in the period that followed the approval of this loan as 
conditions improved. Also, as shown on Table 4.4, average reserves for the post-loan 
period were significantly higher than in the pre-loan period; averaging US$1,749.5 
million and US$1,424.8 million, respectively. The persistent depreciation trend of the 
Costa Rican Colón continued into the post-loan period. The average nominal exchange 
for the post-loan period was ₡431.6 CRCs per USD, compared to ₡352.2 CRCs per USD 
during the pre-loan period. In terms of economic growth, Costa Rica‘s uptick in gross 
domestic product during the period that preceded FLAR‘s loan approval was stabilized in 
the two-year period that followed. Costa Rica‘s average annual GDP growth rate post-
loan was significantly higher than that during the pre-loan period (2.713% versus 4.83 
percent). 
 While EMBI spread data is not available for Costa Rica, it is possible to partially 
capture the effect of this loan on the country‘s debt burden by considering the income 
payments associated with debits accruing from interest payments on the ―other 
investments‖ category of the current account. This category includes—but is not limited 
to—interest payments on foreign-held debt. Income payments from other investments 
decreased after the loan approval, but increased slightly in the second quarter of 2004. 
Thus, the average income payments from other investments during the post-loan period 
were not significantly different from those of the pre-loan period. An alternative method 
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Figure 4.2. Costa Rica’s April 2003 Loan 
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of accounting for the potential effect of this loan involves considering the rates paid on 
zero-coupon bonds issued by the country. As shown in Appendix J, rates on all maturities 
of these loans declined considerably following the April 2003 loan by FLAR. 
 Costa Rica‘s experience with its 2003 loan illustrates one of the basic ways in 
which FLAR loans can benefit member countries. The fact that Costa Rica‘s loan was 
requested during a recovery period reinforces the preventive nature that FLAR‘s 
interventions can adopt. By using a foreign debt restructuring loan from FLAR to 
repurchase a significant portion of its outstanding foreign debt, Costa Rica managed to 
significantly reduce the interest payments associated with its liabilities.  
Table 4.4. Means Tests of Equality: Costa Rica 2003 
  Pre-Loan Mean Post-Loan Mean T-stat
1
 
International Reserves (Mills USDs) 1,424.764 1,749.503 -6.819** 
Exchange Rate (CRC/USD) 352.225 431.612 -12.627** 
Income Payments from Other Investments 
(Mills USDs) 46.888 43.45 
 
-1.098 
GDP Annual Growth Rate (%) 2.713 4.83 -2.327* 
1. Ho: Pre-Loan and Post-Loan Means are equal. 
  * Statistically significant at the α=0.05 level.  
** Statistically significant at the α=0.01 level. 
    
4.4.3 Ecuador 2006 
In the midst of political upheaval, the Ministry of Economics and Finance through the 
Central Bank of Ecuador officially requested a US$400 million balance of payment 
support loan from FLAR on August 26, 2005, which was approved on October 3, 2005. 
Despite having been approved in October, this loan was not disbursed until March 2, 
2006 when the government of newly-elected president Alfredo Palacio was finally able to 
meet the FLAR‘s requirement of having a Central Bank Board in place. Once disbursed, 
the loan was to be repaid in three years with interest rate accruing at the Libor rate plus 
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200 basis points. In addition to the traditional terms of the loan, the agreement with 
Ecuador (FLAR‘s most prolific client to date) stipulated as an additional condition that 
Ecuador maintain a fiscal surplus of at least 2% of GDP during the period 2006-2008 
(FLAR 2006a). 
 Relying on petroleum exports for about 43% of its fiscal revenues, Ecuador‘s 
economy came to a halt during the summer of 2005 as PetroEcuador workers and 
residents from the oil-rich eastern provinces of the country engaged in a general oil strike 
demanding payment of back wages and infrastructure investments (―Venezuela to lend‖ 
2005). The loss in government revenues associated with the strike was estimated by the 
Ecuadorean Ministry of Economics and Finance to be around US$190 million, and was 
cited as the main reason for the loan request (FLAR 2006b). While the country‘s 
economy was in relatively good shape in most other respects, the shock created by the oil 
strike, as well as the volatile political situation complicated the government‘s access to 
financing, and threaten the country‘s liquidity and ability to meet its financial obligations. 
This was further compounded by the dollarization and capital account liberalization 
process in which the country had actively embarked since 2000, which further exposed 
the country to external fluctuations due to changing perceptions of the country‘s ability to 
pay back. 
 The approval of the loan by FLAR, along with the rising price of oil reinstated 
some of the lost investor confidence as evidenced in the successful issuing of a 10-year, 
US$650 million bullet bond in December 2005 (IMF 2006). Once disbursed, the FLAR 
loan contributed significantly to increasing the liquidity of Ecuador‘s Central Bank in the 
first quarter of 2006. Of the US$933 million rise in liquidity, US$400 million originated 
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from this loan (Banco Central del Ecuador 2006). While the oil impasse had been 
partially surmounted by the time the FLAR loan was disbursed, the funds—along with 
part of the proceeds from the December bond issue—were used to repurchase 59.2% of 
its Global 2012 bonds in May 2006 (―Ecuador rescata‖ 2006). Savings from of this action 
were significant given the different yields associated with the new liabilities relative to 
those of the bonds repurchased. While Global 2012 bonds have a 12% yield, the 
December 2005 bullet bonds have a coupon rate of 10.75%, and more importantly the 
FLAR loan had a yield equivalent to the 3-month Libor rate plus 200 basis points, or 
approximately 6.98%. Ecuador successfully paid back the FLAR loan in full 14 months 
in advance of its due date. 
 An empirical analysis of the data (shown in figure 4.3 and table 4.5) for key 
indicators during the two-year periods that preceded and proceeded the approval of the 
FLAR loan further portray an improvement in the standing of the Ecuadorean economy. 
The disbursement of the FLAR loan appears to have allowed Ecuador‘s stock of reserves 
to overcome the temporary setback caused during the disruption of oil exports, allowing 
it to resume the positive trend that prevailed in the pre-loan period. Consequently, the 
average level of reserves during the post-loan period considered was significantly higher 
than that of the pre-loan period—almost doubling from US$1,185.3 million to 
US$2,377.4 million. Arguably the most significant contribution of this loan was its 
contribution to Ecuador‘s regained access to the international financial markets at better 
terms. This is evident in the figures for the Emerging Market Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) 
spread—an indicator of a country‘s cost of accessing funds abroad. The average index 
spread for the two-year-period before the loan was approved stood at 748.5 basis points 
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and declined significantly to an average of 623.2 basis points during the two-year that 
followed—a large spread by regional standards, but a significant improvement 
nonetheless. 
 Both the current and financial accounts appear to have stabilized following the 
approval of the FLAR loan. The current account recorded surpluses in the post-loan 
period and retained a positive trend component. The average current account balance 
improved significantly from US$24.4 million deficit in the pre-loan period to a US$494.2 
million surplus in the post-loan period. Similarly, the trend component of the financial 
account went from a consistent decline to being more stable. However, the figures for the 
average financial account balance during the pre-loan and post-loan periods were not 
significantly different from each other, as revealed in the equality test presented in Table 
4.5 below. Economic growth continued on a more stable path, albeit at slightly lower 
rate. Average annual GDP growth rate in the pre-loan period was significantly higher 
(7.311%) than in the pre-loan period (3.641%). 
 Of the case studies considered, the Ecuadorean 2006 loan provides perhaps the 
clearest evidence of successful intervention by FLAR. Unlike the Colombian case, this 
loan made up a significant proportion of the total assistance available to the country 
during its oil shock. Moreover, the loan was helpful in overcoming this shock and 
contributing to the country regaining access to international financial markets. This loan 
supports the idea that as it stands, FLAR has the ability to play a significant role in 
supporting small member countries, even those which have relied on the fund during 
several crisis episodes. 
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Figure 4.3. Ecuador’s March 2006 Loan 
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Figure 4.3. (continued) 
  
    
 
Table 4.5. Means Tests of Equality: Ecuador 2006 
  Pre-Loan Mean Post-Loan Mean T-stat
1
 
International Reserves (Mills USDs) 1,185.303 2,377.411 -4.437** 
EMBI Spread (Basis Points) 748.545 623.238 2.988** 
GDP Annual Growth Rate (%) 7.311 3.641 3.027** 
Current Account (Mills USDs) -24.376 494.221 -3.412** 
Financial Account (Mills USDs) -33.889 -291.236 1.216 
1. Ho: Pre-Loan and Post-Loan Means are equal. 
  * Statistically significant at the α=0.05 level.  
** Statistically significant at the α=0.01 level. 
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4.5 The Way Forward: FLAR’s Challenges for the Future 
As discussed above, the limited literature on FLAR is full of normative prescriptions on 
means of improving the organization‘s performance and relevance.  It is worth revisiting 
some of the most common of these in light of the analysis just presented, as well as 
considering the position of the FLAR‘s own leadership.  To this end, this section also 
draws from personal interviews conducted during field research at the FLAR‘s 
headquarters in Bogotá, Colombia in 2009.  Interviews were conducted with the 
Secretary General and other department heads.   
 Most prescriptions stem from a recent decline in activity.  The number of loans 
that have been approved and disbursed has decreased dramatically in recent years, 
especially when compared to the 1980s levels. This is more surprising in the last couple 
of years, given the presumed increased in demand for resources from the last global 
crisis. This demand never materialized. Given the rather stagnant levels of capital 
subscribed to the fund, the FLAR is increasingly attractive only to the small countries of 
the region (Ecuador, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Uruguay). The larger member countries 
(Colombia, Peru and Venezuela) are not using FLAR for their BOP and liquidity needs, 
but rather relying on larger (more significant) resources available to them from other 
agencies (e.g. Colombia‘s recent agreement with the IMF, Venezuela‘s contingency lines 
with China—USD‘s for oil). This further complicates the fund‘s ability to attract large 
key players in the region (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina) to join the pool. These 
concerns are indeed reflected by officials in the institution. From interviews with FLAR 
officials, it is clear that they are increasingly acknowledging that the resources being 
contributed to the pool are not growing at the same rate as the economies of the member 
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countries. If this situation continues there is a growing gap between the resources and the 
size of the funds needed to provide a realistic option of support during crisis. 
 Given these challenges, a set of common prescriptions have been proposed in the 
literature (see Agosin 2000, and Agosin and Heresi 2010). The set of policy 
recommendations that has emerged as potential solutions for the resource limitations of 
the Fund can be broadly summarized under four main strategies: 
 Geographic expansion. 
 Resource expansion through larger paid-in capital quotas and the establishment of 
contingent lines of credit with member country central banks. 
 Intermediation in the international financial markets by issuing its own debt 
securities or securing contingent credit lines with private banks. 
 Capturing institutional advantages originating from its supranational nature by 
creating a regional system of payments aimed at minimizing the need for 
international reserves in regional transactions, while intermediating in the 
provision of IMF resources. 
This set of policy recommendations provides a useful roadmap for securing the viability 
of the Latin American Reserve Fund as a veritable source for regional balance of 
payments support and coordination. They should be implemented to ensure that FLAR 
can serve as the seed and foundation for a region-wide mechanism of coordination aimed 
at protecting against balance of payments shocks. The findings explored in the first part 
of this chapter inform and provide further impetus for the promotion of such policies. The 
applicability and relevance of a selection of these policies is explored below in the 
context of the research presented in this chapter. 
 In terms of the first recommendation, FLAR‘s geographic area of reach inhibits 
greater regional cooperation and limits the availability of resources in the fund. The 
benefits provided to the few Andean nations (and Costa Rica and Uruguay) could be 
extended to neighboring nations without significantly altering the current mode of 
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operation. The 1988 Lima Agreement opened the door to the expansion of the fund to the 
rest of Latin American countries. Since then only two non-Andean countries have 
successfully joined FLAR. A potential extension of the reserve pool to other countries in 
the region—especially to the largest ones like Mexico, Brazil and Argentina—could 
provide important benefits to the fund. It would increase the size of the pool, which 
would make it possible to increase the size of potential loans available to member 
countries. As seen in the 1999 Colombian loan case, the participation of FLAR in that 
rescue package, while useful, only accounted for only about 7% of the total required by 
Colombia. Thus, it is easy to understand why twelve years have passed since a large 
member country has requested assistance from the fund.  
 Beyond the clear benefits that derive from having access to a larger pool of 
resources associated with a geographic expansion of FLAR, the inclusion of most 
countries in the region would place the fund in a more favorable position to manage its 
risk profile. First, the introduction of new members into the pool provides the institution 
with the opportunity to diversify the risk structure associated with potential applications 
for support. While similar in many respects, Latin American countries retain some level 
of diversity in terms of their economic structure. This of course does not eliminate the 
possibility of a crisis event occurring that would require the provision of assistance to all 
members in a simultaneous fashion, but it eases the potential strain on reserves associated 
with a crisis event. Despite its relatively limited size, the experience of FLAR reflects this 
point.  
 As seen in Table 4.4, simultaneous loan requests from several member countries 
have rarely coincided, and have never resulted in FLAR being unable to meet its member 
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countries‘ assistance requests. Moreover, as outlined in the second chapter of this 
dissertation and in Rosero and Erten (2010), an expanded regional reserve pool would 
provide a more cost-efficient option of ensuring against contagion tendencies originating 
from neighboring countries. A region-wide reserve pool, by providing prompt access to 
significant sources of balance of payments support and by promoting regional 
macroeconomic coordination, is better equipped to deal with potential contagion events. 
That being said, officials at FLAR acknowledge the difficulties in attracting countries 
like Brazil or Mexico, which they see as growingly becoming part of a global group of 
influential emerging markets with more alternatives for their balance of payments support 
needs. 
Figure 4.4. History of FLAR Loans Granted 
 
                       Source: FLAR‘s August 2010 Annual Report 
 
 In addition to increments in subscribed capital associated with a geographic 
expansion of FLAR, the institution should overcome its resource obstacles by increasing 
the subscribed capital quotas of its member countries. Interviews with officials at FLAR 
revealed that this strategy has been considered during past meetings of the board of 
directors, but has faced some level of reticence from the member countries.  Subscribed 
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capital quotas of individual member countries have not changed since March 2000, while 
these countries‘ economies have grown significantly since then24. As shown in Table 4.6, 
subscribed capital into the fund represents a very small portion of member countries‘ 
total reserves. Large countries like Peru and Colombia pool an equivalent of a mere 1.1% 
and 1.8% of their total non-gold reserves under FLAR. By comparison, smaller member 
countries like Ecuador and Costa Rica have committed quotas equivalent to 5.1% and 
7.2% of their total non-gold reserves. These ratios are even lower when one considers the 
actual contributions in place in the form of paid-in capital. In order to avoid becoming the 
lender of last resort for only small countries in the region, these shares must be updated to 
reflect the current reality of the bigger economies. 
Table 4.6. Subscribed and Paid-in Capital as percentage of Reserves 
 
Subscribed Capital Paid-in Capital 
Bolivia 3.0% 2.4% 
Colombia 1.8% 1.4% 
Costa Rica 5.1% 4.2% 
Ecuador 7.2% 5.9% 
Peru 1.1% 0.9% 
Uruguay 3.0% 1.6% 
Venezuela 3.3% 2.7% 
Source: Based on FLAR data as of August 31, 2010 and the IMF's International 
Financial Statistics dataset. 
 
 Considering an expanded pool made up of the current FLAR members plus 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Paraguay, Agosin and Heresi (2010) point out that a 
contribution into the fund of 15% of these countries‘ reserves could cover capital flight 
equivalent to each of the countries‘ short-term debt. Alternatively, such a fund would be 
                                                 
24 See FLAR’s Assembly Accord No. 93.   
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able to finance capital outflows equivalent to the value of M1 of each of the countries 
with the exception of Brazil and Mexico. As shown below, a similar exercise illustrates 
that even without such a geographic expansion of FLAR, an increase in the size of 
current members‘ contributions could make the fund a more realistic option for balance 
of payments support. Table 4.7 demonstrates how a hypothetical FLAR with paid-in 
capital equivalent to a quarter of its members‘ total reserves (excluding gold) could 
potentially finance capital outflows equal to a member country‘s short-term debt or the 
more stringent measure of M1
25
 (with the exception of Venezuela)
26
. 
Table 4.7. FLAR with Hypothetical Expanded Capital Contributions (2009) 
 
Reserves
1
 
Short-term 
Debt
1
 
Expanded Fund/ 
Short-Term Debt 
M1
1
 
Expanded 
Fund/M1 
Bolivia 7,583,785 554,000 45.6 5,100,053 5.0 
Colombia 24,747,664 4,109,971 6.1 24,687,801 1.0 
Costa Rica 4,066,175 2,341,286 10.8 7,509,382 3.4 
Ecuador 2,873,185 1,419,483 17.8 -- -- 
Peru 32,012,632 4,729,846 5.3 17,480,982 1.4 
Uruguay 8,028,642 1,124,000 22.5 6,184,267 4.1 
Venezuela 21,702,956 16,008,689 1.6 72,319,050 0.3 
Total Reserves 101,015,039         
Expanded Fund  
(25% Contributions) 
25,253,759.70 
        
Source: Author's Calculations based on World Bank National Accounts Data 
  
1In millions of current US Dollars 
     
 As far as intermediation goes, FLAR has made limited progress in taking 
advantage of its preferential access to credit from the international financial markets. The 
institution enjoys strong AA and Aa2 ratings from Standard & Poor‘s and Moody‘s, 
                                                 
25 As argued by Obstfeld et al. (2009), sudden stop exposure goes beyond the traditional 
measures of short-term debt, and depends on monetary depth. Capital flight is also usually 
associated with the domestic and external abandonment of local currency-denominated assets in 
favor of foreign-denominated assets. 
26 Future research should consider a risk-base contribution into a potential regional fund. 
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respectively. These ratings are by far superior to any of those of individual member 
countries sovereign debt, which highlights one of the main benefits of well-managed 
regional pools. However, aside from the successful issuance of bonds in 2003 and 2006
27
, 
little has been done by the institution to capitalize on its preferential access to 
international financial markets. The successful experiences with debt restructuring 
associated with the 2003 Costa Rica and 2006 Ecuador loans highlight the important role 
that FLAR could play in leveraging resources at better terms from the international 
markets, and making part of these resources accessible in the form of loans to its member 
countries. This intermediation process could provide significant savings to its member 
countries, and increase the relevance of the institution in the region. 
 Moreover, in line with the arguments presented in Eichengreen (2006), FLAR 
could play a central role in contributing to the development of markets for assets 
denominated in the domestic currency of countries in the region. This would not only 
contribute to the region‘s overcoming of the original sin, but it would also introduce 
valuable counter-cyclical tendencies to the liabilities side of the fund‘s balance sheet. In 
fact, officials acknowledged during interviews that there have been proposals in this 
regard. However, progress has been discontinuous and more recently hindered by the 
latest global financial crisis, which resulted in increased demand for liquidity by member 
countries. 
 This stands in contrast to the recent success of the institution in serving as an 
alternative destination for liquid investments of regional central banks and public 
                                                 
27 FLAR issued its first bond in 2003. This 3-year, US$150 million bond accrued a fixed coupon 
rate of 3%, and was duly paid. A second 5-year, US$250 million bond with a floating rate 
equivalent to the 3-month Libor rate plus 20 basis points was issued in 2006, and matured earlier 
this year in February.  
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institutions. When questioned about the apparent irrelevance of FLAR to large member 
countries, one official refuted this claim by emphasizing that while the institution‘s role 
in balance of payments support has undoubtedly become less attractive to the larger 
member countries for the reasons outlined above, FLAR has gained significant relevance 
in terms of its second mandate (that of reserves management). This reality makes it clear 
that FLAR has the financial expertise and institutional maturity to reach out and serve 
better more of its current users of financial services. 
 In terms of cooperation with other multilateral institutions, the 1999 Colombian 
loan experience exemplifies the role that FLAR can play in leveraging larger resources 
by coordinating with institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, or the IDB. The prompt 
approval of a US$500 million loan for the country provided a meaningful endorsement of 
Colombia‘s restructuring plan. It arguably made it possible to overcome coordination 
failures associated with first-mover disadvantages in multilateral lending. By signaling 
confidence in the country, FLAR facilitated the later approval of significantly higher 
resources from the IMF, the World Bank, and the IDB (US$2.7, US$1.4, and US$1.7 
billion, respectively). In situations when extraordinary funding is required, FLAR could 
intermediate between its member countries and the IMF through either direct or indirect 
lines of credit from the latter. Given its regional nature and its investment profile, 
FLAR‘s intermediation could ensure access to IMF funds at better terms. Since FLAR‘s 
comparative advantage in multilateral lending derives largely from its knowledge of the 
regional economy (inherent from the participation of the member countries‘ finance 
ministers and central bank directors in its assembly and board of directors), it should 
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work along with the IMF to ensure that conditionality requirements tied to IMF funds are 
in line with the reality and expectations of the region
28
. 
 A final aspect that should inform FLAR‘s strategy going forward, especially in 
the face of diminished demand for assistance, is the restructuring of the asset side of its 
balance sheet. While the balance of payments support role has (and should) played a 
central role in the mission of the institution, a continued redirection towards its second 
mandate would be welcomed. As argued above, the management and technical assistance 
associated with the reserves of the member countries has played an important role in what 
the FLAR does. However there is growing acknowledgement that more can be done to 
improve the performance of not only member country reserve assets, but also those of the 
pool itself. Increasingly public institutions (other than CBs) from member AND 
nonmember countries are taking advantage of the financial expertise in the management 
of resources that FLAR offers. This was for example the case with some of Uruguay‘s 
institutions, which eventually led to the 2008 joining of the country. As of May 2009, 
FLAR‘s intermediation portfolio consisted of deposits from 28 central banks and public 
institutions from not only its member countries, but also from El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and the Dominican Republic. The mutual success associated with attracting these 
deposits from non-member countries should continue to provide a path to future 
geographic expansions of the fund, especially in cases in which the political drive to join 
is lacking. When asked about what future she saw for FLAR, the then Secretary General 
stated that in terms of increasing its relevance and raising its profile, a strong direction 
                                                 
28 Up to this point, loans from FLAR have included conditionality only on a case-by-case basis.  
One official interviewed suggested that it was unnecessary because of the close ties. In his view, 
member countries see FLAR as “a group of friends” and in that sense face “peer pressure” to 
meet their financial responsibilities with the institution. 
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would be ―becoming an administrator of public funds, a trainer of central banks and 
public entities.‖ 
 In the case of FLAR‘s own managed resources, interviews with the directors of 
the Financial Research and Asset Management divisions revealed that there is a growing 
interest in diversifying the maturity terms of assets held by FLAR to match the reduced 
demand for loans. At present, the pool‘s investments are restricted to fixed income, short-
term, investment-grade, US dollar-denominated assets. However, the institution is 
beginning to explore diversifying into higher-yield, higher risk, and longer maturity 
assets such as Fixed Income Bonds from G7, G10, or G23 countries, currencies, or even 
variable income bonds (see Bonza et al. 2009). 
  
4.6 Conclusion 
As evidenced by the recent proposals for intensified regional integration, there is 
significant clamoring for mechanisms of regional coordination and support against crises 
originating from external shocks. The recent actions of countries like Brazil and 
Argentina‘s 2006 early payoff of their IMF loans and their effective withdrawal from the 
IMF suggest a growing desire by several countries in Latin America for a partial 
delinking from international financial institutions (Zibechi 2007). However, success in 
establishing a region-wide mechanism of balance of payments support through either a 
Latin American Reserve Fund or through the Bank of the South has proven limited. In the 
meantime, Latin American countries continue to (individually) accumulate 
unprecedented levels of costly international reserves. The question that arises is: is FLAR 
the right institution to fill the gap left by the weaknesses of existing international 
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financial institutions, and the stagnation of alternative regional proposals like the Bank of 
the South? In order to answer this question, this chapter empirically reviews the past 
performance of FLAR, as well as critically analyses its institutional strengths and 
challenges. 
 The empirical quantitative and qualitative data employed in the three case studies 
considered in this chapter provide preliminary evidence in support of the partially 
successful performance of FLAR. While only a sample of all interventions, and 
descriptive in nature, the findings presented here capture a wide range of the activities of 
the fund in recent years. Four common themes emerge from this analysis about the actual 
and potential benefits of FLAR interventions. First, the institution provides a rapid rate of 
response to loan requests (28 days on average for the three case studies considered), and 
stands in sharp contrast to the traditionally protracted process associated with loans from 
multilateral institutions like the IMF. Second, FLAR has provided important savings to 
its member countries by making funds available to them at better terms than the ones 
available to them in the traditional international financial markets. This is most evident in 
the foreign debt restructuring carried out by both Costa Rica and Ecuador. Third, FLAR 
has proven to be essential in leveraging additional funds for its member countries through 
its own lending process. A prompt loan from FLAR has typically resulted in further 
access to liquidity from other institutions, and thus, it has arguably contributed to 
overcoming coordination failures associated with the first-mover disadvantage in lending. 
Finally, the empirical data considered suggests important improvements in key economic 
indicators following an intervention by FLAR.  
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 From the above discussion on the strategies for FLAR going forward, it is clear 
that while there are aspects that could be improved; the institutional make-up of FLAR 
presents a number of strengths to build upon. Granted it is successful at adopting the 
strategies in the previous section, FLAR is indeed uniquely positioned to fill the gap left 
by the traditional international financial institutions and the still lagging regional 
proposals for integration. 
  In addition to its partial success in adjusting to its funding realities, FLAR 
has managed to diversify its mandate by concentrating on the services and reserve 
management portion of its activities. Moreover, as discussed in the case studies, the fund 
has been uniquely effective at providing prompt support to its member countries during 
times of crisis. The speed of response can help to overcome constraints associated with 
the size of the resources available to central banks under this arrangement. This as well as 
the underlying ease of monitoring can contribute to minimizing the potential for 
contagion throughout the region. 
  Finally, while the political challenges in terms of both disparate country 
size and political ideologies are very real, FLAR has managed to retain an objective 
approach to its economic decisions.  When interviewed, the then secretary general stated: 
―I think that unlike the Bank of South (which hasn‘t been able to settle on a voting 
scheme), FLAR‘s voting mechanism has allowed it to avoid political pressures.‖ This 
voting mechanism demands a supermajority of two-thirds of member states, each of 
which is assigned one vote.  This setup has arguably tested the institutional governance of 
FLAR at times. For example, the selection of last Executive Presidents were problematic, 
as it took years to ensure that a candidate secure a supermajority of the votes. These 
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challenges have originated primarily from ideological differences among members, and 
do not necessarily reflect the presence of a set of dominant countries. Moreover, as 
explained by the then Secretary General, these ideological differences have not extended 
to the realm of loan approvals.  This was evident in the case of Ecuador‘s two most recent 
requests (2006 and 2009). Despite the poor state of diplomatic and economic relations 
between Ecuador and Colombia, she emphasized that in this particular case: ―There was 
not any political interference. All member countries were genuinely concerned about the 
health of the Ecuadorean economy, so it was entirely based on economic considerations.‖ 
 This chapter provides initial evidence to support continuing member involvement 
and expansion of FLAR. It should also serve as further impetus for research in this area. 
It is important to recognize the data limitations associated with analyzing its institutional 
effectiveness. For example, it is difficult to isolate quantitatively the direct impact of each 
loan intervention. However, more qualitative consideration of the context surrounding 
each loan provides a more holistic understanding of the effectiveness and potential of 
FLAR. By considering both quantitative and qualitative evidence from three case studies 
of recent FLAR interventions, as well as interviews with FLAR officials, this chapter 
argues that this institution with an enhanced support from expanded pool of member 
countries, can indeed fill that gap, and thus provide a workable framework for a veritable 
mechanism of crisis support and prevention. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
As discussed throughout this dissertation, developing nations, including those of Latin 
America, have embraced foreign reserve accumulation as a stabilization and development 
strategy. This is evidenced in the record stocks of reserves held by these countries in the 
last few decades. International reserves as precautionary savings must consist of liquid, 
stable, and hard-currency denominated assets. However, due to this very nature, reserves 
come at a significant opportunity cost to the holding country. Moreover, evidence 
(including that presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation) of the effectiveness of these 
individually-held reserves in contributing to crisis prevention or recovery is limited and 
inconclusive. 
In light of these findings, it would be premature and unthinkable in the present 
context to suggest a complete elimination of reserve accumulation by Latin American 
countries. This is particularly the case in situations without a credible alternative 
mechanism in place. Nevertheless, it is not premature to explore alternative methods of 
protection that ensure both stability and effectiveness of national resources committed to 
providing this protection. Thus, the main argument advanced in this dissertation is not for 
the liquidation of reserves, but rather for a sensible growth of them, and more importantly 
for efficient accumulation through collectivized protection in the form of regional pools. 
In the process of developing this argument, this dissertation has contributed to the 
literature in several respects. First, it expanded the discussion on the effectiveness of 
reserves, as well as the motives for the accumulation on the part of Latin American 
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countries. Second, it has provided new empirical evidence to support the viability of 
regional mechanisms of coordination. This chapter summarizes the findings of the three 
separate empirical analyses and discusses possible policy implications. 
 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
5.1.1 Reserves and the Trilemma 
Using a new approach to the assessment of reserve effectiveness, Chapter 2 evaluated the 
gains from individual reserve accumulation through the lens of the traditional trilemma 
approach. Some of the key findings from this chapter include: 
 The VAR analysis finds that contrary to expectations, individual country 
accumulation appears to provide limited help in easing the trilemma of 
international finance. Consequently, when it comes to advancing exchange rate 
stability, capital account liberalization, or monetary policy independence, reserve 
accumulation does not appear to be working. 
 That being said, two key exceptions to the conclusion above were explored, which 
are in line with some the existing related literature. First, reserves were only 
helpful in ensuring exchange rate stability in instances of hard pegs. Second, and 
perhaps more interestingly, findings in this chapter suggest that reserve 
accumulation contributes to easing the trilemma only in instances when reserve 
holdings are sufficiently large. In this regard, this finding supports the idea of a 
reserve efficiency threshold, as proposed in Aizenman et al (2010).  
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5.1.2 Reserve Demand and Contagion 
Chapter 3 contributed to the literature on the precautionary demand for reserves by 
considering the so far ignored importance of contagion risk in the reserve demand 
process. The main findings of this chapter included:  
 In a world with increasingly liberalized markets and imperfect information, Latin 
American countries appear to take into consideration contagion when demanding 
reserves. That is, the evidence suggests that these countries are concerned with the 
conditions both within their borders, but also with those of their neighboring 
nations—which might threaten the stability of their own economies via contagion. 
 Based on this finding, it is clear that any mechanism that could reduce contagion 
risk in the region would also free up significant resources that could be redirected 
to more productive ends. Therefore, by empirically showing that Latin American 
countries currently ―purchase insurance‖ against contagion risk through the 
accumulation of reserves, this chapter provides further support for the creation of 
such mechanisms. 
 One of the benefits of reserve pooling was its potential to reduce contagion, which 
in turn contributes to less balance of payments variability for member countries. 
By considering a framework based on coverage ratios and alternative simulations, 
it found that a regional reserve pool in Latin America would prove beneficial to 
most (if not all) countries in the region even in cases of relatively small reductions 
in balance of payments variability. 
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 The implications of these findings are central to the promotion of countercyclical 
regional arrangements aimed at reducing the cost, while providing equivalent 
levels of insurance protection. 
 
5.1.3 Reserves and FLAR 
By employing empirical quantitative and qualitative data for three loan case studies, this 
chapter provided preliminary evidence in support of the partially successful performance 
of FLAR. The most salient conclusions from this chapter included: 
 FLAR has the potential to serve as a framework for a region-wide reserve pool. 
However, this potential hinges on the institution‘s ability to increase its resources 
either through expansion of its membership, capital paid-in contributions, and/or 
more active intermediation in international financial markets to capitalize on its 
preferential access to these markets. 
 FLAR provides a rapid rate of response to loan requests, which stands in sharp 
contrast to the traditionally protracted process associated with loans from 
multilateral institutions like the IMF. This is of particular importance in light of 
the present limitation in terms of the resources available through the fund. Prompt 
access to crisis support can limit the extent of regional contagion, and thus 
mitigate the need for large interventions. 
 FLAR interventions typically result in important savings to its member countries 
by making funds available to them at better terms than the ones available in the 
traditional international financial markets. 
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 The case studies highlighted the often-ignored, but key contribution that FLAR 
provides to its member countries in terms of leveraging additional resources. 
FLAR loan approvals have arguably facilitated the approval of subsequent loans 
from other multilateral institutions and/or the successful issuing of treasury 
securities. 
 The empirical data considered suggests important improvements in key economic 
indicators following an intervention by FLAR. 
 
5.2 Policy Implications 
Countries in Latin America, like most emerging markets across the globe, have embraced 
reserve accumulation to levels never experienced before. These reserves, however, do not 
come free. They come at a high social opportunity cost to the nations that hold them. 
Countries that by the very nature of their stage of development face large constraints of 
capital are increasingly diverting their productive resources towards the accumulation of 
foreign reserves. Alternative uses such as repayment of short-term debt, investment in 
infrastructure and employment creation measures partially account for the opportunity 
cost of holding massive amounts of foreign reserves. Furthermore, while countries in the 
South hold their reserves in low-yield assets from the North (thereby financing capital-
abundant countries), they continue to rely on foreign flows of capital at high interest rates 
to finance their own development. These social costs of holding an insurance policy 
against financial crisis are considerably high, and they challenge the sustainability and 
optimality of foreign reserve accumulation as development policy for the South. 
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Based on the findings of this dissertation, some important policy implications 
emerge. In the context of unstable financial markets based on imperfect information, and 
without a reliable alternative for protection against exogenous shocks, the accumulation 
of reserves remains a necessary evil to avoid the costly effects of a full-fledged crisis. 
Reserve pooling—as a first step in a process of regional financial coordination—has the 
potential to improve the efficiency of the precautionary accumulation of reserves. 
This dissertation makes a three-pronged case for regional coordination in Latin 
America through the establishment of a strong pool of international reserves. First, a 
region-wide pool, if large enough, could enable member countries to have access to 
reserve stocks that are sufficiently large to meet or exceed the threshold suggested by the 
findings, without incurring the excessive opportunity costs associated with holding 
massive stocks of reserves. Second, since countries in the region insure not only against 
their own risk, but the risk originating from deteriorating conditions in their 
neighborhood, co-insurance mechanisms like regional reserve pool funds would prove 
useful in taking advantage of the cost-savings afforded by these arrangements. Finally, 
FLAR‘s successful experience of over three decades highlights the important role that 
this type of institution has both in terms of responding to regional crises, but also at 
complementing and filling some of the gaps left by the traditional international financial 
structure. 
A cost effective approach to protection against the vagaries of the international 
financial markets must be based on the promotion of regional coordination and support 
through an enhanced region-wide reserve pooling mechanism. FLAR‘s successful track 
record and institutional experience make it a good candidate in the region to serve as a 
128 
 
foundational base of such an institution. While institutional challenges to regional 
cooperation remain, the urgency of protecting against exogenous shocks without 
sacrificing the development agenda shall ensure that this alternative approach to reserve 
accumulation prevails. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS I 
 
Argentina Brazil 
 
RESGDP ERS KAO MPI RESGDP ERS KAO MPI 
 Mean 38.213 0.632 0.387 0.502 30.125 0.470 0.148 0.494 
 Median 36.300 0.690 0.243 0.536 27.600 0.420 0.000 0.434 
 Maximum 68.900 1.000 0.938 1.000 60.800 1.000 0.527 1.000 
 Minimum 13.500 0.018 0.161 0.000 3.900 0.062 0.000 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 14.468 0.346 0.276 0.370 11.746 0.277 0.206 0.388 
 Skewness 0.207 -0.325 0.845 -0.031 0.461 0.399 0.934 0.060 
 Kurtosis 1.992 1.632 2.083 1.360 3.046 1.925 2.141 1.300 
 Jarque-Bera 
3.562 11.851 18.500 
13.46
4 
2.871 9.265 21.128 14.395 
 Probability 0.168 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.238 0.010 0.000 0.001 
 Sum 2751.3 78.4 46.4 60.2 2440.1 58. 3 17.7 58.8 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 14862.4 14.7 9.1 16.3 11036.6 9.5 5.1 17.8 
 Observations 72 124 120 120 81 124 120 119 
 
 Chile Colombia 
 RESGDP ERS KAO MPI RESGDP ERS KAO MPI 
 Mean 68.637 0.514 0.329 0.485 38.297 0.638 0.149 0.489 
 Median 74.450 0.484 0.000 0.393 37.650 0.675 0.161 0.475 
 Maximum 98.200 1.000 1.000 1.000 47.900 0.989 0.692 1.000 
 Minimum 37.500 0.111 0.000 0.000 30.500 0.114 0.000 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 16.501 0.236 0.408 0.382 3.641 0.268 0.175 0.405 
 Skewness -0.366 0.516 0.653 0.099 0.651 -0.299 1.255 0.036 
 Kurtosis 1.886 2.355 1.646 1.350 3.321 1.690 4.136 1.275 
 Jarque-Bera 4.445 7.640 17.700 10.473 5.102 10.720 37.961 10.310 
 Probability 0.108 0.022 0.000 0.005 0.078 0.005 0.000 0.006 
 Sum 4118.2 63.7 39.4 44.2 2604.2 79.1 17.9 40.6 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
16064.7 6. 9 19.8 13.1 888.1 8.8 3.6 13.5 
 
Observations 
60 124 120 91 68 124 120 83 
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Mexico Peru 
 
RESGDP ERS KAO MPI RESGDP ERS KAO MPI 
 Mean 23.1692 0.5602 0.5226 0.5267 49.7960 0.5726 0.6543 0.4538 
 Median 23.6500 0.5282 0.6923 0.5923 56.5500 0.5805 0.7846 0.2611 
 Maximum 43.7000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 107.8000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999 
 Minimum 2.0000 0.0397 0.0000 0.0000 3.2000 0.0093 0.0000 0.0001 
 Std. Dev. 10.5609 0.2839 0.2641 0.3821 28.2015 0.2538 0.3798 0.3976 
 Skewness -0.1797 0.0276 -0.3023 -0.1409 0.1129 -0.3041 -0.5886 0.1779 
 Kurtosis 2.1401 1.7972 2.1274 1.4240 2.0667 2.3532 1.7617 1.2714 
 Jarque-Bera 4.3430 7.4906 5.6346 11.9617 4.7638 4.0725 14.5953 9.7330 
 Probability 0.1140 0.0236 0.0598 0.0025 0.0924 0.1305 0.0007 0.0077 
 Sum 2780.3 69.5 62.7 59.0 6174.7 71.0 78.5 34.0 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 13272.5 9.9 8.3 16.2 97824.6 7.9 17.2 11.7 
 Observations 120 124 120 112 124 124 120 75 
 
 
Venezuela 
 
RESGDP ERS KAO MPI 
 Mean 223.9536 0.7906 0.4300 0.5346 
 Median 247.1000 1.0000 0.4041 0.5776 
 Maximum 466.2000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 Minimum 54.9000 0.0189 0.0615 0.0030 
 Std. Dev. 143.4740 0.3011 0.3035 0.3698 
 Skewness 0.1474 -1.2616 0.6904 -0.1127 
 Kurtosis 1.5182 3.2740 2.0331 1.4339 
 Jarque-Bera 5.3259 33.2804 14.2078 8.8660 
 Probability 0.0697 0.0000 0.0008 0.0119 
 Sum 12541.4 98.0 51.6 45.4 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1132163.8 11.2 11.0 11.5 
 Observations 56 124 120 85 
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APPENDIX B 
PRELIMINARY TESTS 
Stationarity Tests (ADF) 
Variables Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela 
ERS -3.13709 -6.00341 -7.51393 -3.12955 -5.75796 -3.51027 -4.54182 
 
0.0264 0 0 0.027 0 0.0093 0.0003 
  1 0 0 1 0 2 0 
KAO -1.74554 0.267492 -0.96027 -1.35766 -2.20225 -0.86095 -1.75461 
 
0.4059 0.9757 0.7655 0.6007 0.2067 0.7974 0.4014 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ΔKAO -10.7728 -11.0552 -10.7885 -10.8199 -10.7803 -10.824 -10.8232 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MPI -11.3238 -10.0763 N/A -8.45168 -10.2107 -2.92327 -10.591 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 0.0595 0.0001 
  0 0  
0 0 10 0 
RESGDP -1.39098 -2.11086 -0.97046 -3.90781 -2.05693 -0.47539 -1.40848 
 
0.5819 0.2411 0.7582 0.0033 0.2626 0.8909 0.5717 
  1 0 0 0 1 4 0 
ΔRESGDP -11.8718 -7.84949 -7.7911  
-9.13825 -4.099 -7.55782 
 
0.0001 0 0 
 
0 0.0014 0 
  0 0 0  
0 3 0 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistic, p-value, and lag length are presented in that respective order. 
 
 
Sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 Lag Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela 
1 73.93115 40.73573* 23.34886 32.45194* 63.03323 26.04184 36.60845* 
2 13.25679 18.77292 21.59205 8.825801 14.69504 31.43737 16.53149 
3 32.35509* 15.3314 38.08410* 17.9828 26.50608* 16.68376 7.066262 
4 25.71194 14.45667 18.92756 20.08631 10.29119 22.10683 11.70273 
5 22.01281 12.13744 0 12.86697 18.57522 36.74414* 25.84931 
6 13.56958 14.29817 NA 16.11282 12.16971 20.86635 NA 
* corresponds to the lag order selected by the criterion 
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APPENDIX C 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS II 
 
 
 
Reserves Σ EMBI Vulnerability Obli Contagion FloatingD 
 Mean 31567.8 23038258 670.0084 17048.73 1.81E+10 -2.09E-11 0.55 
 Median 19851.7 2364575 371.3487 8411.775 1.81E+10 -0.235073 1 
 Maximum 205539 8.26E+08 6630.392 93937.5 7.32E+10 9.102129 1 
 Minimum 6155.66 37751.38 56.66667 59.48 2.56E+09 -9.263365 0 
 Std. Dev. 33135.38 90960186 1151.781 20547.53 1.52E+10 3.332063 0.498384 
 Skewness 3.058775 6.616327 3.745539 1.787102 1.415417 0.183495 -0.201008 
 Kurtosis 14.15547 50.04582 16.40983 5.314725 5.268075 3.510369 1.040404 
 Jarque-Bera 1935.683 28561.43 2772.293 210.0392 78.39846 4.725437 46.68571 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0.094164 0 
Observations 287 287 282 278 143 287 280 
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APPENDIX D 
PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST (FISHER) 
 
Ho: Unit Root       
Variable At Levels First-Difference 
  Chi-square P-value Chi-square P-value 
lnRESERVES 4.273 0.998 172.85 0 
ln   6.332 0.957 91.343 0 
lnEMBI 15.621 0.337 160.887 0 
lnVULNERABILITY 11.792 0.623 273.797 0 
lnOBLI 10.659 0.558 84.9168 0 
CONTAGION 53.203 0 - - 
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APPENDIX E 
 
FORECASTED CHANGES IN RESERVE DEMAND DUE TO HYPOTHETICAL 
CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF CONTAGION 
 
(In Millions of USDs) 
      Hypothetical 
Changes in 
Contagion 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Argentina Q2 2009 8.99 17.97 26.96 35.94 44.93 53.92 
 
Q3 2009 18.36 36.73 55.10 73.48 91.85 110.24 
 
Q4 2009 28.15 56.30 84.47 112.65 140.84 169.04 
 
Q1 2010 38.34 76.71 115.10 153.51 191.95 230.40 
 
Year 
Aggr. 
93.84 187.72 281.63 375.58 469.57 563.59 
Brazil Q2 2009 37.88 75.76 113.64 151.52 189.40 227.28 
 
Q3 2009 79.17 158.35 237.55 316.76 395.99 475.23 
 
Q4 2009 124.09 248.24 372.43 496.66 620.95 745.28 
 
Q1 2010 172.90 345.91 519.01 692.21 865.51 1038.91 
 
Year 
Aggr. 
414.04 828.25 1242.62 1657.15 2071.84 2486.70 
Chile Q2 2009 4.65 9.31 13.96 18.61 23.27 27.92 
 
Q3 2009 9.42 18.84 28.26 37.69 47.11 56.54 
 
Q4 2009 14.30 28.60 42.91 57.22 71.54 85.87 
 
Q1 2010 19.29 38.60 57.91 77.24 96.58 115.93 
 
Year 
Aggr. 
47.66 95.34 143.04 190.76 238.50 286.26 
Colombia Q2 2009 4.65 9.31 13.96 18.62 23.27 27.93 
 
Q3 2009 9.55 19.10 28.65 38.20 47.75 57.31 
 
Q4 2009 14.69 29.38 44.08 58.78 73.49 88.21 
 
Q1 2010 20.08 40.18 60.29 80.41 100.54 120.68 
 
Year 
Aggr. 
48.97 97.96 146.97 196.00 245.05 294.12 
Mexico Q2 2009 17.09 34.19 51.28 68.38 85.47 102.57 
 
Q3 2009 35.07 70.15 105.23 140.33 175.43 210.53 
 
Q4 2009 53.97 107.95 161.96 215.99 270.04 324.11 
 
Q1 2010 73.81 147.67 221.57 295.51 369.50 443.53 
 
Year 
Aggr. 
179.94 359.96 540.05 720.21 900.43 1080.73 
Peru Q2 2009 6.00 11.99 17.99 23.99 29.98 35.98 
 
Q3 2009 12.36 24.72 37.08 49.45 61.81 74.19 
 
Q4 2009 19.10 38.21 57.32 76.45 95.58 114.71 
 
Q1 2010 26.24 52.50 78.77 105.06 131.36 157.68 
 
Year 
Aggr. 
63.70 127.42 191.17 254.94 318.74 382.56 
Venezuela Q2 2009 3.51 7.02 10.53 14.04 17.55 21.07 
 
Q3 2009 7.19 14.39 21.58 28.78 35.97 43.17 
 
Q4 2009 11.05 22.10 33.16 44.23 55.29 66.36 
 
Q1 2010 15.09 30.19 45.30 60.41 75.54 90.67 
 
Year 
Aggr. 
36.84 73.70 110.57 147.46 184.36 221.28 
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APPENDIX F 
COVERAGE RATIOS UNDER RESERVE POOLING 
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Figure 4b. Brazil
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Figure 4c. Chile
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Figure 4d. Colombia
τ=0
τ=0.2
τ=0.4
τ=0.6
τ=0.8
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
11
p=0 p=0.1 p=0.2 p=0.3 p=0.4 p=0.5 p=0.6 p=0.7 p=0.8 p=0.9 p =1
Figure 4e. Mexico
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Figure 4f. Peru
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Figure 4g. Venezuela
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APPENDIX G 
 
RESERVES SAVINGS DUE TO RESERVE POOLING: HRI – RI 
(in Billion USDs) 
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APPENDIX H 
INSTITUTIONS OF THE ANDEAN AGREEMENT 
 
 
 
  
MEMBER COUNTRIES
Andean Presidential Council
ANDEAN COUNCIL OF 
FOREIGN MINISTERS
ANDEAN COMMUNITY 
COMMISSION
ANDEAN COMMUNITY 
COURT OF JUSTICE
ANDEAN COMMUNITY
ANDEAN PARLIAMENT
MEETING OF SYSTEM 
REPRESENTATIVES
SECRETARY GENERAL OF 
THE ANDEAN 
COMMUNITY
C.A.F. 
F.L.A.R.
ADVISORY BOARDS:
Business & Labor
SOCIAL CONVENTIONS:
Símon Rodriguez Agreement 
Universidad Símon Bolivar
(C) Coordinates; (D) Directs Policy; (F) Formulates Policy; (N) Names; (P) 
Promotes; (Pp) Proposes; (E) Examines, Monitors; (So) Submits Legislation
(N), (E), (D)
(F), (E), (C)
(E), (Pp), (F)
(E), (C)
(E)
(E)
(C)
(P)
Source: Adapted from Bustamante (2004) 
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APPENDIX I 
FLAR’S GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
 
Source: FLAR 
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APPENDIX J 
 
COSTA RICA’S ZERO COUPON BOND RATES  
BY MATURITY TERMS
1
 
 
 
Source: Costa Rican Ministry of Finance  
1
 Maximum yield based on performance at auctions held by the Ministry of Finance. 
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